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INTRODUCTION: NEW YORK CITY AS A NATIONAL MODEL 
In the aftermath of Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission1 and other campaign finance decisions that have made 
the regulation of money in politics more difficult, advocates of 
campaign finance reform have turned to New York City as a potential 
model to emulate.2  New York City’s generous public matching fund 
system allows candidates to compete in elections without raising large 
sums of money, and strict contribution limits—particularly for those 
who do business with the City—are designed to prevent donors from 
having excessive influence.3  New York City has not held major 
citywide elections since 2009, however, and campaign finance law has 
changed considerably since then. 
The much-publicized Citizens United and its progeny, McComish 
v. Bennett4 and SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission,5 
have been accused of opening the floodgates to unprecedented 
campaign spending by outside groups.  The 2012 presidential election 
featured “Super PACs,” well-endowed political action committees 
funded by small groups of individuals.6  These groups accounted for 
nearly half of all political advertisements aired during the presidential 
election, a substantially higher percentage than in past years.7  As 
 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. See Alec Hamilton, Campaign Finance Ruling May Make New York a Model 
for the Nation, WNYC (June 21, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-free-
country/2011/jun/21/campaign-finance-ruling-may-make-new-york-model-nation/. 
 3. See Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., 
http://www.nyccfb.info/press/info/faq.aspx (follow “How do New York City residents 
benefit from the public financing of campaigns?” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6, 
2013) (“Public financing of campaigns has several important benefits to both 
candidates and taxpayers.  First, it makes candidates and elected officials more 
responsive to citizens, rather than to special interests, wealthy donors, and 
corporations.  The importance of smaller contributions is enhanced because 
contributions under $175 from New York City residents become worth six times 
more with public matching funds.  Public financing also helps credible, often 
grassroots and insurgent candidates, who may not have access to ‘big money’, run 
competitive campaigns.  Taxpayers are also rewarded with candidates who have more 
time to reach out to voters and talk about issues, as opposed to spending their time 
fundraising.”). 
 4. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 5. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Keating v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010). 
 6. See Adam Lioz & Blair Bowie, Auctioning Democracy: The Rise of Super 
PACs and the 2012 Election, DEMOS (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.demos.org/ 
publication/auctioning-democracy-rise-super-pacs-and-2012-election. 
 7. See Domenico Montanaro, Outside Groups Make Up Almost Half of All 
Presidential Campaign Ads, NBC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012, 12:13 PM), 
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New York City proceeds towards the 2013 municipal elections, it will 
not only elect a new mayor for the first time since 2001, but will also 
replace many of its citywide office-holders, borough presidents and 
local council members because of term limits.8  Given the stakes, New 
York City’s campaign financing system will likely be tested by the 
infusion of significant third-party spending. 
The New York City Campaign Finance Board’s (CFB) reflective 
report on the 2009 city elections anticipated the different playing field 
that unlimited independent expenditures would create in 2013, 
observing that “[i]ndependent expenditures are of particular concern 
in jurisdictions with public financing programs, because those 
candidates who agree to limit their spending are faced by 
independent expenditure committees without limits.”9  Even before 
Citizens United, independent expenditures had increased significantly 
during the City’s previous two election cycles.10  Campaign finance 
reformers should watch to see whether such a model can survive in 
the post-Citizens United legal and political landscape.  Given the 
explosion of outside spending during the 2012 Republican 
presidential nomination, the Scott Walker recall election in 
 
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/09/17/13917146-outside-groups-make-up-
almost-half-of-all-presidential-campaign-ads?lite; Alina Selyukh, Study of US 
Campaign Ads Finds Growing Role of Outside Groups, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/09/12/usa-campaign-money-
idINL1E8KCE8720120912. 
 8. See David Chen, Some Candidates Get Early Start on Fund-Raising for 2013, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/nyregion/new-york-
candidates-get-early-start-on-fund-raising-for-2013.html.  The 2013 election marks a 
major moment of political transition for New York City.  Shortly after the City 
Charter overhaul of 1989, an independent effort spearheaded by Ronald Lauder led 
to the passage of term limits.  This forced dozens of elected officials from office in 
2001.  Many of the political generation that replaced them in the City Council and 
borough president’s offices served concurrently with Mayor Bloomberg, who led an 
effort to alter the City Charter to allow himself a third term in 2009.  The 2013 
election will likely yield New York City a new mayor, public advocate, comptroller, 
several new borough presidents, a new council speaker, and usher in at least two 
dozen councilmembers. 
 9. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., NEW YORKERS MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD: A 
REPORT ON THE 2009 ELECTIONS 166 (2010) (quoting PAUL RYAN, A STATUTE OF 
LIBERTY: HOW NEW YORK CITY’S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW IS CHANGING THE FACE 
OF LOCAL ELECTIONS 42 (2003)), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/ 
per/2009_PER/2009PostElectionReport.pdf. 
 10. See Joseph P. Parkes, Disclosing Independent Expenditures, GOTHAM 
GAZETTE (Feb. 6, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/ 
archives/853-disclosing-independent-expenditures-. 
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Wisconsin, and the 2012 presidential election, they have reason to be 
nervous.11 
If the New York City model is to be the standard-bearer for the 
nation, then there are issues beyond whether it can properly 
withstand the influence of outside spending.  Even though the public 
matching fund system is credited with increasing and diversifying 
small donor participation, special interest groups like the real estate 
lobby and unions play outsized roles in funding local campaigns, and 
are already significantly impacting the 2013 election.  There are 
questions concerning whether candidates are sufficiently deterred 
from coordinating with outside parties, whether public matching 
funds are used properly, and whether a sophisticated campaign 
finance program has significantly altered the quality or even the 
composition of individuals holding elected office in New York City. 
This Article will focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the New 
York City campaign finance system as it enters its first post-Citizens 
United election cycle.  Part I of the Article recounts the origin and 
evolution of New York City’s CFB, which has regulated elections in 
New York City since 1989, and discusses early developments in New 
York City’s campaign finance law.  Part II analyzes Citizens United 
and other significant campaign finance reform cases that have been 
decided since New York City’s 2009 elections, with an emphasis on 
the decisions’ potential impacts on New York City and the measures 
that New York City has taken in response.  Part III takes a look at the 
major players in the 2013 election and determines whether these 
candidates have benefitted from the recent developments in 
campaign finance law.  Finally, Part IV addresses whether the system 
is properly regulated, and to what extent its shortcomings can be 
remedied.  If New York City is to serve as a model campaign finance 
reform system, advocates seeking to adopt it elsewhere should 
consider the strengths of the system worth emulating, the 
shortcomings that need correcting, and the challenges inherent to the 
intersection of money and politics. 
 
 11. See generally R. Sam Garrett, “Super PACs” in Federal Elections: Overview 
and Issues for Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42042.pdf; Andy Kroll, 10 Numbers You Need to 
Know on Scott Walker Recall Day, MOTHER JONES, (June 5, 2012), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/top-10-wisconsin-scott-walker-recall; 
Mad Money: TV Ads in the 2012 Presidential Campaign, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/track-presidential-
campaign-ads-2012/; Montanaro, supra note 7. 
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I.  THE RULES OF THE GAME: THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW YORK 
CITY PUBLIC MATCHING FUND SYSTEM12 
During the 1980s, New York City became embroiled in a political 
scandal that shook the City’s ruling class.  Donald Manes, the 
powerful Queens Borough President, was investigated by the FBI for 
selling Parking Violations Bureau contracts to companies in exchange 
for kickbacks.13  Manes committed suicide as the charges against him 
mounted, but there was also sufficient evidence to charge one of his 
accomplices, Bronx Borough President Stanley Friedman.14  At the 
same time, Brooklyn Borough President Meade Esposito resigned 
over charges concerning illegal influence peddling, including illegal 
benefits conferred upon Bronx Congressman Mario Biaggi.15  
Although Mayor Ed Koch was not accused of wrongdoing, he was 
politically embarrassed when officials he had appointed as a political 
favor to Esposito were brought down in the scandal.16  Finally, the 
vehicle for the Borough Presidents’ power, the Board of Estimate, 
was struck down in court.17 
The Board of Estimate had represented a unique governing 
structure for a large city like New York.  The eight members of the 
Board included the five borough presidents, each of whom had one 
vote, along with the mayor, city council president, and comptroller, 
who each had two votes.18  The Board of Estimate had enormous 
zoning, contracting, and budgeting powers, which meant an alliance 
of borough presidents could effectively control which companies had 
access to the City.  Staten Island had as much clout on the Board as 
the far more populous Brooklyn.19  The structure was challenged on 
 
 12. For an extremely thorough summary of New York City’s campaign finance 
laws, see JERRY GOLDFEDER, MONEY AND POLITICS (2012).  This short book is a 
step-by-step guide for candidates to navigate New York City’s campaign finance 
system, though it concludes that hiring counsel might be a sound investment. 
 13. Seth Faison, 80s Scandal Unraveled in a Suicide Note, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 
1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/19/nyregion/80-s-scandal-unraveled-in-a-
suicide.html.  A more detailed account of the scandal is covered in WAYNE BARRETT 
& JACK NEWFIELD, CITY FOR SALE: ED KOCH AND THE BETRAYAL OF NEW YORK 
(1988). 
 14. Faison, supra note 13.  
 15. Richard Lyons, Meade Esposito, 86, Former Power in Politics, Is Dead, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/04/obituaries/meade-esposito-
86-former-power-in-politics-is-dead.html. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 690–91 (1989). 
 18. Id. at 694. 
 19. Id. at 702 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)). 
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the grounds that it violated the “one person, one vote” principle 
established in Reynolds v. Sims.  The United States Supreme Court’s 
unanimous decision declaring the Board of Estimate unconstitutional 
on the heels of the Manes, Friedman, and Esposito scandals gave 
reformers an opportunity to restructure local governance.  In 1989, 
voters approved the largest overhaul of the City Charter since 1898, 
when New York became the five boroughs it is today.20 
The new City Charter addressed the corruption scandals of the 
1980s by all but eliminating the power of borough presidents, who 
retained minimal zoning powers, and significantly expanding the 
power of the mayor and city council; the latter expanded to its 
present-day 51 members to increase the potential for racial diversity.  
The new charter also created the nebulous position of public 
advocate, which joined the mayor and comptroller as a citywide 
elected position. 
Another legislative response to the 1980s scandals was the 1988 
adoption of the Campaign Finance Act.21  The legislation created the 
New York City CFB, an independent and nonpartisan entity charged 
with generating local campaign finance laws and regulating 
compliance with them.22  The CFB oversees a campaign finance 
system that imposes disclosure requirements and individual 
contribution limits on all candidates, and limitations on total 
contributions and spending for candidates seeking pubic matching 
funds.23  Originally, “the city’s primary goal for the public finance 
system [was] to limit the influence of money in citywide elections,” a 
position the CFB no longer holds in light of Citizens United, 
discussed infra.24 
 
 20. See Alan Finder, The 1989 Elections: Charter; Overhaul of New York City 
Charter Is Approved, Polls Show, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1989, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/08/nyregion/1989-elections-charter-overhaul-new-
york-city-charter-approved-polls-show.html. 
 21. See generally N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-701 (2012). 
 22. The first Campaign Finance Board was chaired by Fordham University 
President Father Joseph O’Hare, and included among its five board members an 
attorney from the law firm of Pavia and Harcourt, Sonia Sotomayor. N.Y.C. 
CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY: CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND THE NEW 
CITY COUNCIL (1992), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/92_PER-intro-
ch.2.pdf. 
 23. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-718 (2012).  Interestingly, state law theoretically 
preempts the New York City laws as they apply to the voluntary system’s non-
participants. See GOLDFEDER, supra note 12, at 13 n.2. 
 24. Larry Levy & Andrew Rafalaf, High Court’s Recent Decision on Public 
Matching Funds Renders New York City’s Campaign Finance System Ripe for 
Constitutional Attack, ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. ONLINE (July 11, 2011), 
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The public matching fund program was the centerpiece of the 
voluntary program.  Initially, the city matched contributions at a 1:1 
ratio for the first $1,000 contributed by each New York City 
resident.25  Eligibility was contingent on raising a certain number of 
donations and donors from the district where the election was taking 
place, and total matching funds were capped at 50% of the total 
expenditure limits.26  The eligibility requirements and cap have 
remained largely intact, but during the 2001, 2003, and 2005 elections, 
the first $250 were matched at a ratio of 4:1.27  The 1998 law that 
expanded the matching ratio to 4:1 also introduced the “bonus” 
matching funds, which increased the ratio of matching funds for 
participating candidates who faced well-financed opponents who 
spent beyond the CFB voluntary limit.28  During the 2009 election the 
ratio was changed to 6:1 for the first $175 of a contribution, and that 
ratio remains in effect for the 2013 election.29 
By lowering the amount of money that is matched and increasing 
the degree to which it is matched, the system is designed to encourage 
more small donor participation.30  One analysis suggests, “the 




constitutional-attack.  Today, the CFB’s mission is described as follows: “The CFB’s 
mission is to increase voter participation and awareness, provide campaign finance 
information to the public, enable more citizens to run for office, strengthen the role 
of small contributors, and reduce the potential for actual or perceived corruption.” 
Welcome to the Campaign Finance Board, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., 
http://www.nyccfb.info (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 25. 2 N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., ON THE ROAD TO REFORM: CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
IN THE 1993 NEW YORK CITY ELECTIONS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (1994), available at 
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/94_PER_execsumm.pdf.  Interestingly, the CFB 
report highlighted the municipal unions, the United Federation of Teachers union 
and the Real Estate Board of New York as the three largest donors to 1993 
candidates. Id. at 7 tbl.2.  Twenty years later, all three entities retain prominent roles 
in the landscape of local campaign spending. 
 26. See id. at 3. 
 27. Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe & Brendan Glavin, Small Donors, Big 
Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 
11 ELECTION L.J. 3, 9 (2012), available at http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/state/NYC-as-a-
Model_ELJ_As-Published_March2012.pdf. 
 28. 1998 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 48 (codified as amended at N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 3-703 (2012)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Malbin et al., supra note 27, at 19.  The CFB’s auditing of the matching 
fund process is rigorous; during the 2009 election cycle the CFB denied almost twenty 
percent of matching fund requests on the grounds that they violated a condition of 
eligibility. GOLDFEDER, supra note 12, at 26. 
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number of donors who give, as well as the diversity of the census 
block groups in which they reside.”31  Another report explained, 
“What differentiates New York’s program is that it looks to level the 
playing field less between candidates and more between donors.”32  
With the demise of “trigger-fund” public financing systems following 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in McComish v. Bennett, New York 
City’s campaign financing system is increasingly being discussed as a 
model for jurisdictions across the country.33  Recently, good 
government groups and other advocates have pushed for the New 
York City model to be adopted at the state level.34 
II.  CAMPAIGN FINANCE JURISPRUDENCE AND NEW YORK CITY 
A. Citizens United and New York City’s Response 
Few cases in recent years, and certainly no campaign finance 
reform case, have garnered as much attention as Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission.35  What began as an innocuous case 
about whether a “documentary” about Hillary Clinton, Hillary: The 
Movie, could be aired on television within thirty days of a Democratic 
presidential primary election, morphed into the definitive case on the 
limits of First Amendment speech in the campaign context.36  
Overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and 
invalidating sections of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 
(BCRA),37 the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, held that “[g]overnment may not suppress political speech 
on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity,”38 and that “[n]o 
sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech 
of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”39  Detailed analysis of the 
holding in Citizens United and debate over whether the case was 
 
 31. Malbin et al., supra note 27, at 17. 
 32. Hamilton, supra note 2. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Thomas Kaplan, Wealthy Group Seeks to Reform Election Giving in New 
York, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/12/nyregion/ 
coalition-urges-public-financing-in-new-york-state-elections.html. 
 35. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).  This legislation was also commonly 
known as “McCain-Feingold” for its sponsors in the United States Senate, John 
McCain (R-Arizona) and Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin). 
 38. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365. 
 39. Id. 
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correctly decided would merit its own law review article, and indeed 
has,40 but its main implications were two-fold. 
Legally, the decision established that the government could not 
articulate an anti-corruption principle with respect to non-
coordinated independent expenditures.41  Because the Court rejected 
the anti-distortion principle used to justify limiting independent 
corporate expenditures in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, corruption or the appearance of corruption were the only 
grounds under which the government could restrict First Amendment 
political speech.  The Court could not, however, identify a sufficient 
government interest in reducing corruption or the appearance of 
corruption absent a quid pro quo exchange.  While such an exchange 
could be inferred by a direct contribution to a candidate, the Court 
did not recognize the danger of a quid pro quo exchange by 
independent spending.42  The Court’s sweeping view of the First 
Amendment and the rights it conferred on corporations and unions 
opened the door to challenges against many federal and local 
campaign finance reform laws.  Importantly, however, the Court 
pointedly did not apply this expansive reasoning to direct 
contributions.43  The Court also upheld the constitutionality of 
disclosure requirements, even for independent expenditures.44 
The second major implication of Citizens United was its cultural 
impact, as the decision became a quasi-partisan political flashpoint.  
To some, Citizens United “opened the floodgates” to corporations 
buying elections, thereby undermining democracy.45  The trouble with 
 
 40. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: 
Campaign Finance after Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643 (2011); 
Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and 
Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497 (2010); 
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After 
Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010); Monica Youn, First Amendment 
Fault Lines and the Citizens United Decision, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 135 (2011). 
 41. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 359–60. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 359 (“Citizens United has not made direct contributions to candidates, 
and it has not suggested that the Court should reconsider whether contribution limits 
should be subjected to rigorous First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
 44. Id. at 366 (“Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to 
speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities’ . . . .” (citation 
omitted)). 
 45. See Anjeanette Damon, Citizens United Didn’t Just Open Up Money 
Floodgates for Corporations, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 15, 2012, 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/jul/15/citizens-united-didnt-just-open-money-
flood-gates-/; Sean Siperstein, Citizens United v. We the People, HUFFINGTON POST 
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this rhetoric is that wealthy donors, corporations and unions had little 
difficulty spending large sums of money in prior elections, however 
easier the Citizens United decision made it.  To the persons who 
sought to spend large amounts of money in elections and their 
supporters, Citizens United was a First Amendment triumph that 
validated their behavior.46  From this point of view, big money in 
politics was no longer sleazy—it was justified under the Constitution.  
The emergence of Charles and David Koch,47 Foster Friess,48 and 
Sheldon Adelson,49 billionaires who spent lavishly during the 2012 
presidential elections, may have been in part due to their assurance 
that the act of spending millions of dollars on electoral politics was 
legal under a recent Supreme Court decision.  Such legitimized 
meddling has also come to the New York area; in a 2012 Long Island 
Congressional race, a Super PAC bankrolled by a hedge fund focused 
on rolling back Dodd-Frank financial regulations spent almost 
$300,000 in an unsuccessful effort to defeat the incumbent 
Democrat.50 
In a metropolis like New York City, full of wealthy individuals and 
powerful corporations, any cultural shift toward a politics more 
permissive of unfettered campaign spending could be dangerous.  As 
then-mayoral candidate Rudy Giuliani testified at a Campaign 
Finance Board hearing in 1991, “[I]t is demonstrable that . . . very, 
very often over the last ten to fifteen years . . . public officials in New 
York City were incapable of making decisions in the public interest 
because of the effects of money and the huge amounts donated by 
 
(Jan. 20, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sean-siperstein/citizens-
united-v-we-the-_b_1219221.html; Jules Witcover, Supreme Court Contempt, CHI. 
TRIB., June 27, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-27/news/sns-
201206261500--tms--poltodayctnyq-a20120627-20120627_1_montana-supreme-court-
pacs-campaigns. 
 46. See John Nolte, Why the Media Hates and Fears Super PACs, BREITBART 
(June 12, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Journalism/2012/06/12/Why-MSM-
Hates-SuperPACs. 
 47. Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens United Changed the Political Game?, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-has-
citizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html. 
 48. Jim Rutenberg & Nicholas Confessore, A Wealthy Backer Likes the Odds on 
Santorum, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/ 
us/politics/foster-friess-a-deep-pocketed-santorum-super-pac-backer.html. 
 49. Editorial, In Thrall to Sheldon Adelson, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/opinion/in-thrall-to-sheldon-adelson.html. 
 50. Rachael Marcus & Michael Beckel, House Candidates Fear Super PACs, 
CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/09/13/ 
10859/house-candidates-fear-super-pacs. 
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some.”51  The Citizens United Court likely would respond that 
Giuliani’s concerns were properly addressed by the Court’s decision 
to maintain the distinction between contributions and independent 
expenditures drawn in Buckley v. Valeo.52  To Justice Kennedy, a 
“huge” contribution to a campaign account might leave open the 
possibility of corruption, but a “huge” independent expenditure could 
not, because it lacked a “quid pro quo” element.53 
The CFB wasted no time in responding to the Citizens United 
decision.  The same day the decision was handed down, CFB 
Executive Director Amy Loprest issued a statement noting that the 
decision involved independent expenditures, and did not change the 
law with respect to direct contributions.54  In a nod to a part of the 
Citizens United decision that expounded on disclosure 
requirements,55 the statement also vowed to enhance disclosure 
requirements through the New York Campaign Finance Act.56 
The ensuing political dialogue led the City Charter Revision 
Commission to place an amendment to the City Charter on the 2010 
ballot.57  New Yorkers would vote on requiring the “public disclosure 
of independent expenditures made ‘to influence the outcome of a city 
election or referendum.’”58  The CFB backed this “Independent 
Expenditure Amendment.”  The issue was bundled with several 
others as a single referendum on revising the City Charter.  Despite 
its complexity, the amendment passed easily, eighty-three to 
 
 51. Nicole A. Gordon & Hyla Pottharst Wagner, The New York City Campaign 
Finance Program: A Reform That Is Working, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 605, 607 
(1991), available at http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1553 
&context=ulj. 
 52. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 53. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (citing 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 296–98 (2003) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 54. Press Release, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., Statement of CFB Executive 
Director Amy Loprest on the U.S. Supreme Court Ruling in Citizens United v. FEC 
(Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/press/news/press_releases/2010-
01-21.pdf. 
 55. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (“Disclaimer and disclosure requirements 
may burden the ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related 
activities’ . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 56. Press Release, supra note 54. 
 57. Charter Revision Ballot Questions, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., 
http://www.nyccfb.info/public/voter-guide/general_2010/ballotProposal.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 58. Parkes, supra note 10. 
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seventeen percent.59  CFB Spokesman Eric Friedman explained that 
the purpose of the new law was to close the “disclosure gap” and 
allow voters to identify candidates’ supporters.60 
In March 2011, the CFB began hearings on how to draft effective 
regulations under the Independent Expenditure Amendment.  In 
their testimony before the CFB’s hearing on “Promulgating Rules for 
the Disclosure of Independent Expenditures,” Ciara Torres-Spelliscy 
and Mark Ladov highlighted the Supreme Court’s strong defense of 
disclosure in recommending that the CFB adopt an expansive 
disclosure policy: 
 In fact, while invalidating longstanding restrictions on corporate 
political spending, the Court’s recent Citizens United decision 
reaffirmed that disclosure and disclaimer requirements for political 
advertisements are presumptively valid.  In doing so, eight Justices 
agreed that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements . . . impose no 
ceiling on campaign-related activities, and do not prevent anyone 
from speaking.”  And, the Court went on to praise transparency of 
money in politics, explaining: “The First Amendment protects 
political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to 
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.  This 
transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and 
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”  This 
holding in Citizens United echoes the holding in the earlier 
McConnell decision where eight of nine Justices also embraced 
robust disclosure for electioneering communications.61 
As the disclosure amendment wound its way through the rule-
making process, the CFB and other reform proponents sought to 
make it as robust as possible.  That meant crafting a rule broad 
enough to require disclosure from third parties participating in the 
election, whether or not they explicitly used specific terms to 
advocate for or against certain candidates.  CFB Chairman Father 
Joseph Parkes wrote, 
 
 59. Javier Hernandez, Once Again, Voters Approve Term Limits, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/nyregion/03limits.html. 
 60. Nathaniel Herz, Campaign Finance Board Clamps Down on Super PAC-Style 
Spending, N.Y. WORLD (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/ 
2012/03/26/city-campaign-finance-board-clamps-down-on-super-pac-style-spending/. 
 61. Testimony of Ciara Torres-Spelliscy & Mark Ladov, Counsel, Brennan Ctr.’s 
Democracy Program, to N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., Hearing on Promulgating Rules 
for the Disclosure of Independent Expenditures (Mar. 10, 2011) (footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366, 371 (2010)), 
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/NYC%20CFB% 
20Testimony%20Torres-Spelliscy%20and%20Ladov%20March%2010%202011.pdf. 
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 For disclosure to be meaningful, it should be as inclusive as 
possible.  Voters who pay attention during election season know 
that most campaign messages do not rely on straightforward words 
like “vote for” or “defeat.”  Disclosure requirements limited only to 
expenditures for messages like these that constitute “express 
advocacy” would keep most independent political spending in the 
dark.   
 Our proposed rules take a more realistic view.  Though it may 
mention a public policy issue, a mailing sent before an election 
declaring that “Candidate X is extremely out of touch with New 
York City” or “Candidate Y is wrong for Brooklyn” may have no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an attempt to influence the 
outcome.  These are effective campaign messages.  In many cases, 
they are written to evade the express advocacy standard and escape 
scrutiny.  Any meaningful disclosure requirement would allow the 
public to see which interests are paying to broadcast them.62 
The effectiveness of such a broad definition of campaign advocacy 
is clear.  The federal courts have struggled over “magic words” that 
made a message cross the line from educational to express advocacy.63  
Under the new CFB rules, any campaign message with the intent or 
effect of helping or hurting a candidate would fall within the 
disclosure requirement.  Parkes continued by explaining,  
Any voter will be able to go online and view financial information 
for city candidates and the independent groups who support or 
oppose them in a single place. In the next mayoral election, New 
Yorkers can trust that all spending by and for the candidates will 
happen in public view.64   
Indeed, spending a mere $100 puts an outside entity into this 
disclosure regime,65 so the CFB is unlikely to let any significant 
outside group slip through the cracks.  As with any disclosure regime, 
its effectiveness will be based on whether the public utilizes the vast 
wealth of information these disclosures will provide.  Given the 
extensive political coverage of New York City politics through its 
 
 62. Parkes, supra note 10. 
 63. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam) (“This construction 
would restrict the application of § 608(e)(1) to communications containing express 
words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your 
ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”). 
 64. Parkes, supra note 10. 
 65. See N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., GUIDE TO THE CFB INDEPENDENT 
EXPENDITURE DISCLOSURE RULES 2 (2010), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/ 
PDF/rulemaking/Independent-Expenditures-Guidance.pdf. 
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newspapers, blogs, and good government groups, one can expect that 
any significant independent political spending in the 2013 election 
cycle will come to light. 
The specific guidelines regulating the CFB’s disclosure goals are 
laid out in Board Rule 1-08(f).66  The new rules require disclosure of 
whether a third party has any relationship with the candidate’s 
campaign, or whether an expenditure was made in coordination with 
the candidate’s campaign.67  The CFB’s definition of coordination is 
itself quite extensive, a response to the ever-graying area in federal 
law.  The rule even specifically requires disclosure of whether rental 
space is shared, perhaps made explicit in light of the Working 
Families Party and Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
previously having been found to conduct campaign activities at the 
same address as City Council campaigns.68 
At the federal level, the line between lawmakers and the PACs 
that spend “independently” on their behalf is already incredibly 
blurred.69  The CFB’s commitment to rigorously preventing sham 
independent groups from skirting campaign finance laws is 
particularly important given the track record of federal coordination 
laws.  A recent Fifth Circuit decision, Federal Election Commission v. 
Cao, defined coordination so narrowly that any sophisticated political 
actor could avoid running afoul of the law with the slightest bit of 
foresight.70  During the 2012 presidential election campaign, 
surrogates and fundraisers from the candidates’ campaigns and 
outside groups mingled and spoke at each other’s events.71  The CFB 
 
 66. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. R. 1-08(f) (2010). 
 67. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. R. 1-08(f)(i)–(vi) (2010). 
 68. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. R. 1-08(f)(vi) (2010); see N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. 
BD., CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD FINAL AUDIT REPORT OF FRIENDS OF ANNABEL 
PALMA (2007) [hereinafter ANNABEL PALMA FINAL AUDIT], available at 
http://www.nyccfb.info/reports/FA_pdf/FA-2003-apalma-767.pdf. 
 69. Jake Sherman, John Bresnahan & Kenneth Vogel, A Super PAC-Politician 
Firewall? Not Quite, POLITICO (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news 
/stories/0812/79854.html. 
 70. See In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Evan Palenschat, 
Campaign Finance Reform in the Post-Citizens United Era (Part 1), N.Y. CIVIC 
(Apr. 10, 2012), http://nycivic.org/story/campaign-finance-reform-post-citizens-
united-era.  The easiest way for candidates to circumvent the federal policy is to have 
trusted proxies, such as former chiefs of staff, leave their campaigns shortly before 
elections to run parallel campaign operations under liberated PAC guidelines. 
 71. Eliza Newlin Carney, The Super PAC Paradox, ROLL CALL (Mar. 12, 2012), 
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_107/Super-PAC-Paradox-213021-1.html; David 
Dayen, Super PAC Organizer Rove to Speak at Candidate Romney’s Donor Event, 
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hoped to have records of independent expenditures made by third 
parties available by the fall of 2012.72  A special election for Bronx 
City Council District Twelve in November 2012 was the first election 
for which the disclosure rules applied.73  A relatively small 
expenditure from the SEIU on behalf of the eventual winner, Andy 
King, became the first expenditure disclosed under the CFB’s new 
system.74 
B. SpeechNow.org v. F.E.C. and the Rise of Super PACs 
Citizens United’s legal impact was immediate.  SpeechNow.org v. 
Federal Election Commission, which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided less than two 
months after Citizens United, truly opened the floodgates to 
unlimited spending by independent parties.75  SpeechNow.org is a 
front group for the conservative anti-tax organization Club for 
Growth.76  Claiming its purpose was solely to make independent 
expenditures, not direct contributions to campaigns, in 2007 
SpeechNow.org sought to retain nonprofit status and receive 
unlimited contributions from individuals without filing as a political 
action committee.77  The Federal Election Commission (FEC) was 
unable to provide SpeechNow.org with an advisory opinion, as it 
lacked the number of members to issue advisory opinions at the 
time.78  In 2008, SpeechNow.org filed in the District Court for the 
District of Columbia, claiming that it was a violation of its First 
Amendment rights and the rights of its donors to be subjected to 
 
FIREDOGLAKE (June 21, 2012, 1:41 PM), http://news.firedoglake.com/2012/06/21/ 
superpac-organizer-rove-to-speak-at-candidate-romneys-donor-event/. 
 72. Email from Eric Friedman, Dir. of External Affairs, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. 
Bd., to author (Aug. 3, 2012, 3:36 PM EST). 
 73. Id.  The election is to fill the vacancy left by Councilmember Larry Seabrook, 
who was convicted of fraud. See Aaron Edwards, Possible Candidates for Seabrook’s 
City Council Seat Emerge, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com 
/2012/07/28/nyregion/challengers-to-succeed-seabrook-on-city-council-emerge.html. 
 74. Celeste Katz, Race to Replace Larry Seabrook a Test Case for New Outside-
Spending Report Rules, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 26, 2012, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2012/10/race-to-replace-larry-
seabrook-a-test-case-for-new-outside-spending-report-rul. 
 75. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 76. Lisa Graves & Brendan Fischer, Millionaire Insiders Hide Behind Group 
Attacking Feingold, CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://www.prwatch.org/node/9559. 
 77. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 567 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 78. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 690. 
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registration, reporting requirements, and contribution limits.79  
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the District Court upheld the 
contribution and reporting requirements for non-profits, holding that 
such organizations were “uniquely positioned to serve as conduits for 
corruption both in terms of the sale of access and the circumvention 
of the soft money ban.”80 
While the case was on appeal to the D.C. Circuit, however, the 
Supreme Court handed down Citizens United.  In light of that 
decision, SpeechNow.org argued that the FEC could no longer argue 
that independent expenditures raised corruption or appearance of 
corruption concerns.  It stood to follow that contributions to 
organizations making independent expenditures could not do so, 
either.  The D.C. Circuit largely agreed, holding that contribution 
limits on entities making contributions to organizations engaged only 
in independent expenditures was unconstitutional.81  Thus, 
individuals, corporations, unions, and other entities were able to give 
unlimited amounts to PACs, creating so-called “Super PACs.”82 
More nefariously, in the view of campaign finance reformers, 
nonprofit 501(c)(4) groups that were not subject to reporting 
requirements could also raise funds through anonymous donors and 
then donate them to PACs, creating a subterfuge that defeated the 
purpose of PAC reporting requirements.83  The D.C. Circuit did, 
however, uphold disclosure requirements, finding that “the public has 
an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate and who is 
funding that speech,” and that disclosure requirements “deter[] and 
help[] expose violations of other campaign finance restrictions, such 
as those barring contributions from foreign corporations or 
individuals.”84 
The close relationship between 501(c)(4)s, PACs, and candidates 
could prove problematic for those seeking to limit special interest 
influences in New York City.  Even though the CFB has moved to 
 
 79. SpeechNow.org, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 73. 
 80. Id. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 690. 
 82. The Court’s decision was clarified by the Federal Election Commission. See 
Carol A. Laham, AO 2010-09, 2010 WL 3184267 (Fed. Election Comm’n July 22, 
2010). 
 83. Diane Freda, Anonymous Donations Can Remain Secret Despite IRS 
Requirement to Disclose, BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2012), http://go.bloomberg.com/ 
political-capital/2012-07-26/anonymous-donations-can-remain-secret-despite-irs-
requirement-to-disclose/. 
 84. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 698. 
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institute new disclosure laws that would prevent money from being 
anonymously funneled through nonprofits to political action 
committees, the special interests that routinely contribute large 
amounts to candidates can now contribute far larger sums to PACs.  
For example, real estate developers currently are limited to $4,950 in 
individual contributions to candidates and maximize their impacts by 
having multiple partners or employees contribute at that level, or by 
bundling legal contributions for a candidate.  Now a developer could 
just as easily take one million dollars to set up a PAC with similar 
electoral and policy goals.  Other interest groups, like unions, already 
have sophisticated campaign infrastructures, and would have less to 
benefit from SpeechNow.Org, though the decision certainly does not 
hurt them.  The impact of potential New York City “Super PACs” is 
discussed at greater length in Part III. 
C. McComish v. Bennett and Trigger Funds 
In the meantime, another set of campaign finance reform cases 
weaved its way through the federal courts.  The Arizona public 
financing system, established by referendum following a series of 
scandals in the late 1990s that engulfed numerous state legislators, 
was challenged as an unconstitutional infringement of the First 
Amendment.85  A similar “clean elections” system was challenged 
concurrently in Connecticut.86  Like the New York City system, 
Arizona encouraged voluntary participation into a system in which 
candidates could receive public matching funds in return for a pledge 
to limiting the amount they raised and spent.  Non-participating 
candidates were free to raise and spend as they wished, but if they 
spent above the amount of public funding given to participating 
candidates by the state, they “triggered” the state to award their 
opponents a dollar for dollar match of any amount above that 
threshold.  In verbiage that would come back to haunt Arizona, this 
provision was designed “to level the political playing field” between 
well-financed candidates and their publicly financed opponents.87 
This “trigger” provision became the subject of the legal challenge 
against Arizona’s system.  Candidates such as State Senator John 
 
 85. McComish v. Brewer, No. CV–08–1550–PHX–ROS, 2010 WL 2292213 (D. 
Ariz. Jan. 20, 2010). 
 86. Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 241 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming 
District Court’s holding that the trigger funds unconstitutionally infringed on First 
Amendment rights, citing Citizens United). 
 87. McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825–26 (2011). 
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McComish claimed that the provision infringed on his right to free 
speech because he was less inclined to spend money knowing that 
doing so would automatically result in his opponent spending more 
money to defeat him.88  Even more unfair, McComish claimed, was 
that this law included any amount spent on his behalf, even by an 
independent outside party, such that an uncoordinated advertising 
campaign in his favor would trigger funds that his opponent could use 
to defeat him.89  In the aftermath of Citizens United, it was clear that 
this provision would be scrutinized. 
The District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,90 but the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, holding that the trigger funds, rather than restricting 
First Amendment speech, led to the infusion of more speech.91  The 
court pointed to a “scattered” and “vague” factual record that 
displayed only “a minimal burden on First Amendment rights” due to 
candidate or donor concerns over trigger fund repercussions.92  The 
case was argued before the Supreme Court in early 2011, with 
Citizens United still fresh on the minds of a public that again 
conferred more attention than usual to the campaign finance reform 
decision.  Only a few months earlier, at his State of the Union 
address, President Barack Obama’s condemnation of Citizens United 
had created a political firestorm.93 
The Supreme Court once again decided by a 5-4 margin that the 
campaign finance regulations before them did not survive First 
Amendment scrutiny.94  The dissenters argued that Arizona was 
merely injecting “more speech” into the political arena, but the 
majority held that trigger funds improperly “leveled the playing field” 
and disincentivized speech by requiring a candidate spending money 
on his campaign to “help disseminate hostile views” by triggering 
state funds to flow to his opponent.95  The Court’s ruling was not a 
death-blow to public financing, but in finding trigger funds 
 
 88. See Brief for Petitioners at 30–31, McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 
(2011) (Nos. 10-238, 10-239). 
 89. See id. at 32. 
 90. Brewer, 2010 WL 2292213. 
 91. McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 92. Id. at 513, 517–18. 
 93. Steve Padilla, Obama’s State of the Union Address: Criticism of the Supreme 
Court Campaign Finance Ruling, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2010), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2010/01/obamas-state-of-the-union-
address-criticism-of-the-supreme-court-campaign-finance-ruling.html. 
 94. McComish v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011). 
 95. Id. at 2821 n.8. 
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unconstitutional and once again demonstrating a strong preference 
for unfettered First Amendment campaign speech, the ruling wiped 
out the “clean elections” laws operating to various degrees in nine 
different states.  This cast an even brighter spotlight on New York 
City’s system. 
Trigger funds were not a prominent feature of the New York City 
system, but they did exist.  Under the 2009 CFB guidelines, 
participating candidates received public matching funds at a rate of 
6:1.96  Those funds increased to a matching rate 8.57:1 when a 
nonparticipating opponent spent three times over the voluntary 
contribution limit.97  Thus one could argue that the New York City 
system was penalizing certain levels of fundraising by rewarding 
candidates with higher matching fund rates.  The CFB distinguished 
the Arizona law from New York City’s in a statement issued by CFB 
Executive Director Amy Loprest immediately following the Supreme 
Court’s decision.98  The statement laid out two main differences 
between the Arizona and New York City laws.  First, the Arizona law 
provided grants from the state once a nonparticipating candidate 
breached the trigger threshold, whereas in New York City candidates 
received higher matching fund rates for money privately raised.99  
Second, the Arizona provision was triggered by the amount spent by 
non-participating candidates and independent groups spending on 
their behalf, while the New York law did not consider independent 
actors at all.100  The statement also pledged to study the matter 
further.101 
Loprest was not alone in defending the viability of the New York 
City system in the wake of McComish.  Fordham Law Professor 
Zephyr Teachout expressed optimism that the decision did not, as 
feared, “touch public financing generally, and did not touch 
 
 96. Morgan Pehme & Janos Marton, Pulling the Trigger: U.S. Supreme Court 
Threatens Campaign Finance Reform in NYC, HUFFINGTON POST (June 24, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/morgan-pehme/pulling-the-trigger-us-
su_b_883387.html. 
 97. Id.; see also The Bonus Situation-2009 Citywide Elections, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN 
FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/candidates/candidates/bonusSituation.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2013).  There was also an intermediary bonus if a non-participating 
candidate breached the voluntary spending limit, but spent less than three times the 
limit. Id. 
 98. Press Release, supra note 54. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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automatic matching funds.”102  Teachout trumpeted the Fair Elections 
Now Act, which would provide a federal matching fund system akin 
to the New York City model.103  Loyola Law Professor Richard 
Hasen, who also runs ElectionLawBlog.com, wrote after McComish 
that the New York City system “works differently” than the struck-
down Arizona system, and suggestively titled his article, “New York 
City as a Model?”104 
Even if the ruling left New York City as a possible national model, 
it did not leave New York City’s trigger provision untouched.  In 
April 2012, approximately nine months after the McComish decision, 
the CFB began drafting rules “drawn up to keep as much fairness in 
the system as possible, while complying with the Supreme Court 
decision.”105  According to New York Civic, a good government 
group, the CFB had “recently scrubbed any mention of this 
mechanism of leveling the playing field from their website and 
literature.”106  Given the hostile reaction of certain Supreme Court 
justices to “leveling the playing field,” in McComish, this was a 
prudent decision.  The new rules developed since McComish no 
longer provide a higher matching fund rate contingent on opponent 
spending, but participating candidates are permitted to exceed CFB 
spending limits if their nonparticipating opponents do the same, 
though only with privately-raised funds.107 
D. Ognibene v. Parkes: “Pay to Play” on Trial 
On the heels of Citizens United and McComish, supporters of 
campaign finance reform had to be concerned when New York City 
faced an inevitable legal challenge in Ognibene v. Parkes.108  The suit 
was brought by James Bopp, the legendary architect of the movement 
 
 102. Zephyr Teachout, What the Court Did and Didn’t Do, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-the-future-
of-public-financing/matching-funds-what-the-court-didnt-touch. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Richard Hasen, New York City as a Model?, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/27/the-court-and-the-future-of-
public-financing/new-york-city-as-a-model-for-campaign-finance-laws. 
 105. Chris Bragg, In Wake of Recent Supreme Court Ruling, NYC Campaign 
Finance Board Nixes Key Provision, CITY & ST. (Apr. 13, 2012), 
http://www.cityandstateny.com/wake-supreme-court-ruling-nyc-campaign-finance-
board-nixes-key-provision/. 
 106. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-706(3) (2012). 
 108. 599 F. Supp. 2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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to end campaign finance regulation, having brought dozens of 
challenges to campaign finance regulations since the 1980s, including 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and Citizens United.109  
Bopp challenged a number of provisions of the New York City law, 
including the new “pay to play” provision, which severely curtails 
contribution limits for entities that do business with the City.110  The 
named plaintiff, Thomas Ognibene, was a Queens politician who had 
mounted a number of campaigns on Republican and Conservative 
lines from the 1980s through 2008, including a primary challenge to 
Mayor Bloomberg in 2005 that was snuffed out when the Bloomberg 
campaign successfully challenged his signatures.111 
Local Law 34, an amendment to the Campaign Finance Act that 
the City Council passed easily in 2007,112 had limited the size of 
contributions that people doing business with the City could 
contribute to candidates, whether or not the candidates participated 
in the voluntary matching fund system.113  This “pay to play” 
provision severely curtailed contribution limits for individuals doing 
business with the city and extended the ban against corporate 
contributions to LLCs and partnerships.  The regulation was 
expansive, covering persons who contracted with the City, sought 
zoning approvals, or purchased real property from the City.114  Those 
who did business with the City were limited to making $400 
contributions for citywide races and $250 for council races, regardless 
of whether the recipient was participating in the voluntary matching 
fund program.115 
 
 109. David Kirkpatrick, A Quest to End Spending Rules for Campaigns, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/25/us/politics/25bopp.html. 
 110. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702 to 3-703 (2012).  Local Law 34 was later 
amended by Local Law 67. 
 111. Robin Shulman, Ognibene Loses Bid for Line on Ballot Against Bloomberg, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/04/nyregion/metro 
campaigns/04ognibene.html. 
 112. See Ognibene, 599 F. Supp. 2d 434. 
 113. 2007 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 34 § 2 (codified as amended at N.Y.C. ADMIN 
CODE § 3-702 (2012)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.; see also N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3-702 to 3-703 (2012).  The tendency of 
the Campaign Finance Act and its amendments to apply restrictions equally to 
participating and non-participating candidates led to at least one critic declaring the 
entire Act constitutionally suspect.  Daniel Katz wrote that in an effort “not to strip 
the non-participating candidate distinction of all meaning,” the Campaign Finance 
Act permitted nonparticipating candidates to self-fund beyond regular contribution 
limits, concluding, “The result of this is that a non-participating candidate is bound 
not to accept more than a participating candidate from any source other than the 
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While the 2007 amendments broadly defined doing business with 
the city, and enacted severe restrictions on contribution limits, given 
the billions of dollars at stake whenever a city rezones an area for 
redevelopment, the City’s policy rationale was evident.116  During the 
2006 hearings on the then-proposed amendments, the CFB found that 
twenty percent of contributions during the 2001 and 2005 elections 
had come from individuals and entities doing business with the city, 
and that those contributions were frequently large, and 
disproportionately made to incumbents.117  Ognibene claimed that the 
new laws violated the First Amendment, and led a class of plaintiffs 
filing for an injunction against them in advance of the 2009 elections. 
Judge Laura Taylor Swain of the Southern District of New York 
soundly rejected Ognibene’s claims, finding all of the challenged CFB 
provisions constitutional.  Judge Swain found that under the 
framework set forth in Buckley v. Valeo, the government had 
established a rational basis for the stricter contribution limits by 
demonstrating the “substantial evidence of the existence of a public 
 
candidate’s own funds.” Daniel Katz, New York City’s Campaign Finance Law Is 
Unconstitutional, ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. ONLINE (Mar. 16, 2009), 
http://aglr.wordpress.com/2009/03/16/new-york-citys-campaign-finance-law-is-
unconstitutional/.  Katz points out that this is not much of a distinction, given that the 
right to unlimited self-fundraising was firmly established in Buckley and did not 
depend on the City carving out a statutory exception. See id.  Katz’s conclusion, that 
the system “functionally reduces non-participating candidates from any person who 
does not wish to participate in the city campaign finance system, to only those people 
who are using their own resources to finance a campaign,” id., is perhaps an 
overstatement.  In 2012, two first-time candidates for city council, Ken Biberaj and 
Corey Johnson, raised the maximum funds permitted for participating candidates by 
the July 2012 reporting date. Chen, supra note 8.  This maximum threshold 
(approximately $80,000–90,000) for city council candidates is not a particularly 
arduous sum to raise by political fundraising standards, as evidenced by these novice 
candidates reaching it fifteen months before their respective primaries.  While 
Biberaj and Johnson have not indicated that they will abandon the matching fund 
program, it stands to reason that future candidates with the ability to raise several 
hundred thousand dollars for their city council races will bypass the matching fund 
system, just as presidential candidates have abandoned the presidential public 
financing program in recent election cycles. Challenges in the Presidential Public 
Financing System, PUB. CITIZEN (July 19, 2012), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
presidential-election-public-financing-challenges.pdf. 
 116. Major re-zoning developments that have recently sought approval, been 
approved or currently seek approval as this Article goes to print include Atlantic 
Yards (Brooklyn), the NYU expansion (Manhattan), Hudson Yards (Manhattan), 
East Midtown (Manhattan), Manhattanville (Manhattan), Kingsbridge Armory 
(Bronx), and Willets Points (Queens).  Collectively, and in many cases, individually, 
these development projects are worth billions of dollars. 
 117. Ognibene, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 449. 
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perception of corruption or the potential for corruption by those 
doing business with the City.”118 
Ognibene appealed the case to the Second Circuit.  While the case 
was on appeal, the Supreme Court issued its Citizens United decision, 
and the plaintiffs asked the Second Circuit to re-brief the matter.119  
The Second Circuit asked the parties to submit briefs on the 
significance of Citizens United on the case before the court.  While 
the CFB’s position was clear from its earlier statement—that the 
Supreme Court had clearly distinguished between contributions and 
independent expenditures—James Bopp now focused on Justice 
Kennedy’s argument that speakers could not be distinguished on the 
basis of their identities, maintaining that New York City’s law 
unconstitutionally discriminated against persons solely on the basis of 
their financial dealings with the city.120 
Even in the aftermath of Citizens United, the Second Circuit 
rejected plaintiffs’ claims and upheld New York City’s campaign 
finance laws, including the prohibition on corporate contributions, 
disclosure requirements, and the “pay to play” provisions.121  As the 
court pointed out, Citizens United had followed Buckley’s bifurcation 
of contributions and independent expenditures, and applied its First 
Amendment analysis to expenditures.122  The provisions at issue in 
Ognibene v. Parkes all related to contributions, where the courts 
could still give considerable deference to the government’s goal of 
reducing corruption or the appearance of corruption. 
In June, the plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court declined to 
review the decision,123 which assured that key provisions of the New 
York City law would remain in place for the 2013 elections.  
Following the decision, New York City Law Department senior 
counsel Jane Gordon channeled the Second Circuit when she stated, 
“The City’s highly regarded Campaign Finance Law addresses a 
 
 118. Id. at 448. 
 119. Jisha Dymond, Ognibene v. Parkes: NYC Lobbyists’ Challenge Revived in 
Wake of Citizens United, CORP. POL. ACTIVITY L. BLOG (Feb. 24, 2010), 
http://www.corporatepoliticalactivitylaw.com/index.php/2010/02/ognibene-v-parkes-
nyc-lobbyists-challenge-revived-in-the-wake-of-citizens-united/. 
 120. Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19, Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 
(2d Cir. 2011) (Nos. 09-0994-cv(L), 09-1432-cv(CON)), 2010 WL 6710720. 
 121. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 122. Id. at 183–84. 
 123. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 28 
(2012). 
MARTON_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2013  7:22 PM 
696 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
significant governmental interest in reducing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption.”124 
Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s decision to decline review came 
on the same day that it reversed a Montana Supreme Court decision 
limiting corporate spending on state elections.125  The Montana ruling 
had seemed to be at odds with Citizens United, but the Montana 
Supreme Court had held that Citizens United did not apply to state 
campaign finance laws, particularly laws predicated on very real 
issues of corruption, which had precipitated the passage of Montana’s 
campaign finance laws more than a century earlier.126  Montana’s 
documented rationale for legislating against the corrupting influence 
of corporations challenged Justice Kennedy’s assertion that 
independent spending by definition could not be corrupting.  The 
Supreme Court did not buy the argument, however, issuing another 5-
4 defeat to campaign finance reform. 
Thus, even though New York City’s system survived this round of 
litigation, the Supreme Court’s message to Montana made it clear 
that the campaign finance jurisprudence governing Citizens United 
would apply to New York City, should New York City attempt to 
defy Citizens United by regulating independent expenditures in any 
meaningful way.  While the four dissenting Justices in Citizens United 
and McComish may well be open to revisiting those decisions, the 
Court’s current jurisprudential trajectory clearly favors First 
Amendment campaign speech over government regulation.127 
E. McDonald Challenges New York City Contribution Limits 
With the 2013 Republican field for mayor still up in the air during 
summer 2012, George McDonald, the founder of the non-profit Doe 
 
 124. Joseph Ax, Supreme Court Declines to Hear NY Campaign Finance Case, 
REUTERS (June 25, 2012), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/ 
New_York/News/2012/06_-_June/Supreme_Court_declines_to_hear_NY_campaign_ 
finance_case/. 
 125. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012). 
 126. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 5–6 (Mont. 2011). 
 127. In a recent matter, the three Republican members of the F.E.C. held that 
under Citizens United, an employer was permitted to coerce its employees into 
participating in campaign activity, provided the activity was independent from the 
campaign. United Public Workers, MUR 6344 (Fed. Election Comm’n Aug. 21, 
2012), available at http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/12044320562.pdf.  
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit recently had to reverse a District Court decision 
lifting the ban on corporate contributions to campaigns that had relied on Citizens 
United.  The case may be appealed to the Supreme Court. United States v. 
Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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Fund, declared himself as a possible candidate.128  As neither a 
lifelong politician nor a candidate who could self-fund an entire 
campaign, McDonald would have difficulty raising sufficient funds 
under New York City’s contribution limits.  On January 7, 2013, 
McDonald brought suit challenging New York City’s contribution 
limits on the grounds that state law preempts them, which allows for 
significantly higher contribution limits (individuals may contribute 
$19,700 from primary elections, and $41,000 for general elections, and 
corporations are permitted to donate directly to campaigns).129  
McDonald’s complaint claimed that the City Council had no 
authority to legislate contribution limits in contravention of state law, 
and that state election law occupied the field.130  In an accompanying 
press release, McDonald added that the current system was “rigged” 
against “everyday New Yorkers,” and “[w]ithout a personal fortune 
or preexisting base of donor support, it’s impossible to raise the funds 
necessary to compete for the Mayor’s office in New York.”131 
Election lawyer Jerry Goldfeder previously has written, “State law 
appears to preempt localities from enacting contribution or 
expenditure limits.”132  Fellow election lawyer and former state 
senator Marty Connor somewhat concurred: “I wouldn’t say 
[McDonald’s lawsuit is] a frivolous case,” though he noted, “the 
courts seemed to give leeway in past years to the city doing its own 
thing.”133  Should McDonald succeed in his suit, candidates during the 
next election cycle would be more than tempted to leave a voluntary 
public matching fund system that caps spending at such a low figure in 
comparison to the enormous individual contributions allowed by state 
campaign finance laws.  On the other hand, if Governor Cuomo 
 
 128. Celeste Katz, Doe Fund Founder George McDonald Mulling 2013 Mayoral 
Bid on Republican Line, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2012), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2012/08/doe-fund-founder-george-
mcdonald-mulling-2013-mayoral-bid-on-republican-line. 
 129. Complaint, McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 100038-2013 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2013), available at http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/iscroll/ 
SQLData.jsp?IndexNo=100038-2013 (follow “Summons and Complaint” hyperlink). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Celeste Katz, Document Drop: George McDonald vs. the CFB, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, Jan. 8, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2013/01/ 
document-drop-george-mcdonald-vs-the-cfb. 
 132. Goldfeder, supra note 12, at 13 n.2. 
 133. Andrew Hawkins & Shane Kavanaugh, McDonald to Challenge Campaign 
Finance Limits, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Oct. 2, 2012, http://www.crainsnewyork.com/ 
article/20121002/INS/121009989. 
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continues his pursuit of campaign finance reform at the state level,134 
McDonald’s suit could be rendered moot, as the City and State 
election laws become mirrors of each other.   
On May 1, 2013, Justice Kathryn Freed issued an exhaustive 
decision rejecting McDonald’s petition.135  The decision reviewed the 
legislative history behind New York City’s campaign finance laws and 
concluded that New York City’s public financing system was “merely 
another approach to electing public officers,” and thus permitted 
under Municipal Home Rule.136  On May 17, 2013, McDonald 
announced that he would appeal Justice Freed’s decision, highlighting 
the “deviant” behavior of potential matching fund recipients Anthony 
Weiner and Vito Lopez as examples of the system’s failure.137 
III.  THE SPENDERS: NEWCOMERS AND REPEAT PLAYERS IN NEW 
YORK CITY ELECTIONS 
New York City’s political commitment to vigorously regulating 
money in politics is remarkable given the City’s preponderance of 
wealthy individuals, corporations, and savvy political operators.  Even 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, New York City remains 
flush with campaign donors who are contributing more to campaigns 
than ever.  Through the first five disclosure periods of the 2009 
election (through July 2008), 34,494 contributors had donated $14.1 
million, with more than half of the contributions coming from 
Manhattan.138  By the end of the 2009 election, the twelve citywide 
 
 134. Katrina Vanden Heuvel, Cuomo’s Clean Elections Choice, NATION (Jan. 22, 
2013), http://www.thenation.com/blog/172346/cuomos-moment-truth-clean-elections-
choice#.  State legislative proposals include pubic financing and strict contribution 
limits. 
 135. McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., No. 100038/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 
1, 2013). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Celeste Katz, GOP’s George McDonald Dings “Deviants” Anthony Weiner, 
Vito Lopez in CFB Fight, N.Y. DAILY NEWS DAILY POL. (May 17, 2013, 5:12 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2013/05/gops-george-mcdonald-
dings-deviants-anthony-weiner-vito-lopez-in-cfb-fight.  Anthony Weiner, a mayoral 
candidate, was the subject of a controversy relating to lewd photos he sent over 
Twitter, and potential City Council candidate Vito Lopez recently resigned his State 
Assembly seat over sexual harassment charges. Raymond Hernandez, Weiner 
Resigns in Chaotic Final Scene, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/nyregion/anthony-d-weiner-tells-friends-he-will-
resign.html. 
 138. Contributions to New York City Candidates, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., 
http://www.nyccfb.info/maps/maps.htm?sm=press_maps (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
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candidates raised over $34 million.139  Five disclosure periods into the 
2013 election, 48,713 contributors had donated $20.4 million, with 
Manhattan accounting for 58.5% of the contributions.  The uptick in 
contributions from 2009 may simply be a result of the more crowded 
field for mayor and higher number of open City Council seats.  
Considering the vast sums being spent on the 2012 presidential 
elections by candidates and outside parties, $20.4 million is not an 
enormous figure.  According to the Center for Responsive Politics, 
the New York metro area had contributed $143.5 million to the 2012 
presidential election as of September 1, 2012,140 and New York 
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand had raised over $14 million for her re-
election campaign.141  With the 2013 election approaching, several 
interest groups are expected to reprise their perennial involvement in 
campaign spending, while other organizations are muscling up for the 
first time. 
A. Self-Funding 
If there was ever a reason to doubt the efficacy of New York City’s 
campaign finance reform laws, it was the political ascent of Michael 
Bloomberg.  During Bloomberg’s three campaigns for mayor in 2001, 
2005, and 2009, he self-funded to the tune of $74 million, $85 million, 
and $102 million, respectively.142  Had Bloomberg participated in the 
matching fund system, he would have been capped at $6 million for 
the general election, which is how he outspent his participating 
opponent, Bill Thompson, by a margin of fourteen to one.143  
Reflecting on those campaigns, New York Public Interest Research 
 
 139. Azi Paybarah, Stringer and Quinn Set the Standard on Bundlers, While de 
Blasio and Thompson are Liu-Like, CAPITAL N.Y. (Nov. 30, 
2011),http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2011/11/4364815/stringer-and-
quinn-set-standard-bundlers-while-de-blasio-and-thomps.  This figure does not 
include the $102 million of Michael Bloomberg’s own money that he spent on behalf 
of his re-election efforts. 
 140. Top Metro Areas, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
overview/topmetro.php (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 141. Kristen Gillibrand Campaign Finance Summary, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., 
http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/summary.php?cid=n00027658 (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2013). 
 142. Michael Barbaro, Michael Bloomberg Spent $102 Million to Win 3rd Term, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/27/nyregion/ 
28spending.html. 
 143. See id. 
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Group staff attorney Gene Russianoff felt that Bloomberg had “done 
long-term damage to the system.”144 
Even before Bloomberg’s mayoral runs and Citizens United, the 
Supreme Court had spoken clearly on the unconstitutionality of 
regulating self-financing.145  The self-financing option remains 
available for wealthy individuals, of which New York has no shortage.  
John Catsimatidis, owner of the Gristedes supermarket chain, had 
floated his name as a potential self-funded candidate in 2009, prior to 
term limits being overturned, and may well run in 2013.146  
Catsimatidis has said that if he does not run, he might consider 
putting money into a Super PAC if he feels strongly about a 
particular candidate.147  “It’s got to be a level playing field with the 
unions, and I’m sure they’ll be matched dollar for dollar,” he said, 
“So yes, I think it could be very important next year.”148  In a head-to-
head mayoral campaign Catsimatidis’s opponents would not even 
have the benefit of the trigger funds utilized by Mark Green, 
Fernando Ferrer, and Bill Thompson in their general election 
campaigns against Bloomberg’s limitless checkbook.  As of January 
2013, Catsimatidis has deposited one million dollars into his own 
account,149 and told Joe Lhota, a potential rival for the Republican 
nomination, that he was willing to spend ten or twenty million dollars 
of his own money, and “that’s your challenge, and you have to decide 
what you want to do.”150 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. See generally Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).  In a 5-4 
decision authored by Justice Alito, the Court held that penalties assessed against 
candidates who self-funded beyond a certain amount did not serve any government 
interest, because Buckley v. Valeo had held that self-funding reduced, rather than 
increased, corruption. Id. at 726. 
 146. Interview by Sam Roberts with John Catsimatidis (NY1 television broadcast 
June 2, 2012), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRE58BujDWM. 
 147. Daniel Massey, Super PACs Eyed for Mayoral Election, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. 
(May 13, 2012), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120513/POLITICS/ 
305139969.  Catsimatidis has intonated that someone he feels “strongly” about 
supporting is New York Police Department Commissioner Ray Kelly. 
 148. David Chen, In 2013 Races, New York Prepares for ‘Super PAC’ Effect, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 31, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/nyregion/new-york-city-
regulators-prepare-for-super-pacs-effect-on-local-elections.html. 
 149. Beth Morrissey, The Mayoral Money Game, N.Y. WORLD (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2013/01/24/mayoral-money-game/. 
 150. Grace Rauh, Lhota Lays Groundwork for Possible Mayoral Campaign, NY1 
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.ny1.com/content/top_stories/174932/lhota-lays-groundwork 
-for-possible-mayoral-campaign. 
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For his part, Bloomberg will not be spending freely for a fourth 
straight election.  Bloomberg acknowledged that spending liberally 
on behalf of his preferred candidate “wouldn’t work,” and would 
likely backfire.  His preferred candidate is currently Quinn, though 
the field remains in flux.151 
B. A New York City Super PAC 
On the first day of 2008, a law took effect that banned candidates 
from accepting money from LLC’s and partnerships.152  While LLCs 
and partnerships had already donated 3.2% of all contributions in the 
2009 elections, that category of donation will be gone entirely by New 
York City’s 2013 elections.153  However, corporate money will happily 
find a home in PACs, and perhaps even Super PACs, in New York 
City elections. 
The 2012 federal election cycle demonstrated the impact of Super 
PACs, with large amounts of money funded by a small number of 
individuals.154  Super PACs raised more than $300 million for that 
election cycle, 68% of which came from mega-donors contributing 
$500,000 or more.155  Crain’s New York wrote that the emergence of 
Super PACs in New York City was “inevitable,” and noted that they 
increased the viability of a late-entry candidate like New York Police 
Commissioner Ray Kelly.156  “There will be super PACs,” said New 
York Republican State Committee Chairman Ed Cox.  “It’s 
impossible not to have them.  They’re a part of the process now.”157  
Cox added, “You’ll find there will be a lot of people in this city, which 
is a wealthy city, who will want to support the candidate, and the 
mechanism to do that will be a super PAC.”158 
 
 151. Sally Goldenberg, Mike ‘Cashing Out’ of Next Mayor Race, N.Y. POST, Dec. 
27, 2012, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/mike_cashing_out_of_next_mayor_race 
_8yja6L8NqPhSiOK-kCkgq. 
 152. 2007 N.Y.C. Local Law No. 34 § 18.1 (codified as amended at N.Y.C. ADMIN. 
CODE § 3-702 (2012)); see N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(l).  The law survived a 
constitutional challenge in Ognibene v. Parkes. See supra Part II.D. 
 153. Hamilton, supra note 2. 
 154. Josh Israel, Two-Year Anniversary of SpeechNow v. FEC Ruling, THINK 
PROGRESS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/03/26/451808/two-
year-anniversary-of-speechnoworg-v-fec-ruling/?mobile=nc. 
 155. Paul Blumenthal, Super PAC Contributions Top $300 Million, Most Goes To 
GOP Groups, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/08/22/super-pac-contributions_n_1822290.html. 
 156. Massey, supra note 144. 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. 
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Crain’s listed Ray Kelly (who has the support of Catsimatidis and 
former chairman of the New York Stock Exchange, Richard Grasso, 
as potential super PAC donors), New York State Board of Regents 
Chancellor Merryl Tisch, and charter schools executive Eva 
Moskowitz as potential beneficiaries of Super PAC funding.159  
Crain’s is a business trade publication, so it is not a coincidence that it 
highlighted individuals perceived to be more “business-friendly” and 
in line with Mayor Bloomberg’s economic policies than the 
Democratic candidates, though the paper did not rule out business 
Super PAC support for a moderate Democrat, City Council Speaker 
Christine Quinn.160 
C. The Education Wars 
The proliferation of charter schools has been perhaps the most 
controversial educational issue during Mayor Bloomberg’s tenure.  
Mayor Bloomberg has championed the expansion of charter schools, 
co-locating them in many existing public school buildings.161  Because 
the state legislature and the next mayor will have the ability to undo 
much of Mayor Bloomberg’s work on this issue, charter school 
supporters have formed a PAC, StudentsFirstNY, which will be led 
by top Bloomberg aide, Micah Lashner, and which counts 
Bloomberg’s former Board of Education Chancellor, Joel Klein, as 
one of its board members.162  StudentsFirstNY states its mission rather 
innocuously: “StudentsFirstNY is New York’s leading voice for 
students who depend on public education for the skills they need to 
succeed, but who are too often failed by a system that puts special 
interests, rather than the interests of children, first.”163 
More substantively, the organization is expected to advance a 
policy agenda of reforming public school teacher tenure and 
proliferating the number of charter schools in New York City.  
StudentsFirstNY has vowed to raise $50 million over the next five 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. See, e.g., Al Baker, Likely Mayoral Contenders Suggest Improving 
Bloomberg’s Leadership of Schools, NY TIMES, Nov. 19, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/20/nyregion/nyc-mayoral-hopefuls-discuss-
improving-schools.html. 
 162. Anna Phillips, StudentsFirstNY Announces Itself, SCHOOLBOOK (Apr. 4, 
2012), http://www.schoolbook.org/2012/04/04/studentsfirstny-announces-itself/. 
 163. Our Mission in New York, STUDENTSFIRSTNY, http://www.studentsfirst.org/ 
pages/our-mission-in-new-york (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
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years to support Mayor Bloomberg’s education policy,164 an enormous 
sum by New York City political standards.  Bill de Blasio and John 
Liu, 2013 mayoral contenders, have said that they will not accept 
donations from the PAC, while Christine Quinn has said that she will 
accept their donations, and presumably, would not complain about 
their outside spending on her behalf.165 
While StudentsFirstNY may be new to the political landscape, their 
target and foe, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), has long 
been a heavy spender in New York elections.166  In the 2005 
Manhattan Borough president race, for example, the UFT spent 
aggressively against City Councilmember Eva Moskowitz, a well-
known charter school supporter.167  UFT President Michael Mulgrew 
has vowed to push back against StudentsFirstNY spending by 
devoting significant UFT resources to the 2013 elections, and even 
raised the possibility of the UFT forming its own super PAC.168 
But the UFT has concerns beyond StudentsFirstNY—it will likely 
negotiate a new contract for 75,000 teachers with the next mayor.169  
The UFT has given the maximum $4,950 to all four of the leading 
Democratic mayoral candidates, Council Speaker Christine Quinn, 
former Comptroller Bill Thompson, Public Advocate Bill de Blasio, 
 
 164. Sarah Butrymowicz, Ed in the Election: New York Group Tries to Tie 
Romney to Anti-Union Group, HECHINGERED (Aug. 17, 2012), 
http://hechingered.org/content/ed-in-the-election-new-york-group-tries-to-tie-
romney-to-studentsfirst_5410/. 
 165. Azi Paybarah, With Eye Toward the UFT, de Blasio Rejects 
StudentsFirstNY, CAPITAL N.Y. (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/08/6481074/eye-toward-uft-de-
blasio-rejects-studentsfirstny; see also Celeste Katz, More NYC Pols Swear Off 
Students First NY Campaign Help, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 21, 2012, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2012/08/more-nyc-pols-swear-off-
students-first-ny-campaign-help. 
 166. See, e.g., Carl Campanile, UFT’s $6.3M Albany Tab, NY POST, Oct. 25, 2010, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/uft_albany_tab_uD4z5ZGiZLNa1KBoUSCH6N 
(discussing the UFT’s lobbying and campaign expenses in 2010). 
 167. See Michael Cooper, Scott Stringer Wins a Crowded Primary and a Likely 
Election as Borough President, NY TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/09/14/nyregion/metrocampaigns/14manhattan.html (discussing Scott Stringer’s 
defeat of Eva Moskowitz in the democratic primary election for Manhattan borough 
president and noting the UFT’s opposition to Moskowitz’s candidacy and support for 
Stringer). 
 168. Chen, supra note 148. 
 169. Michael Howard Saul, Union Money Floods City’s 2013 Election, WALL ST. J., 
July 23, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444330904577 
539593988630720.html. 
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and Comptroller John Liu, though it has not endorsed a candidate.170  
“We are going to be there financially,” Mr. Mulgrew said, “[a]nd, 
then, we have to engage in our organizing, grass-roots work.”171 
D. The Long Reach of Unions and the Working Families Party 
While union membership has been in decline across the country for 
decades, one wouldn’t know it from observing the role that unions 
play in New York City politics.  The UFT may be among the better-
known unions in the City, but it is only one of many involved in local 
elections.  Another education-based union, the Council of School 
Supervisors and Administrators, has boosted its political spending 
fifty-seven percent from this point in the 2009 election cycle.172  Their 
spokesperson, Chiara Coletti, attributed the increase to involved 
educators having been “under tremendous attack politically.”173  As of 
late July 2012, the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union 
(RWDSU) had already contributed more than $31,000 to 2013 
candidates, doubling its pace from 2009, and had persuaded the City 
Council to pass living wage legislation in the process.174  Noting the 
union’s increased activity, union president Stuart Appelbaum 
explained, “We’re putting more focus on electing people who we 
think can push a working person’s agenda forward.”175 
Despite the overarching goal of increasing wages and benefits for 
their respective members, unions have differing relationships with the 
other titans of local campaign spending, the members of the real 
estate industry.  While construction unions often lobby alongside 
developers with an eye towards construction jobs, unions like the 
RWDSU go head to head with developers over wage issues.  In 2009, 
Related Companies attempted to develop the Kingsbridge Armory in 
the Bronx by bringing a mall to the large, underdeveloped space.176  
Advocates of “living wage” legislation, which would have required 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Sam Dolnick, Panel Approves Conversion of Kingsbridge Armory into 
Mall, NY TIMES CITY ROOM (Oct. 19, 2009, 3:32 PM), 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/panel-approves-conversion-of-
kingsbridge-armory-into-mall/. 
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developments that receive city subsidies to pay a living wage,177 
pushed for all jobs at Kingsbridge to pay ten dollars per hour.178  
Related Companies is no stranger to the political arena, having 
donated large amounts to both Democrats and Republicans during 
the 2012 election (its largest single donation was $100,000 to Restore 
Our Future, a pro-Romney PAC), and it was ready to play hardball.179  
Despite prolonged negotiations, Related Companies and union-
backed living wage advocates reached an impasse.180  Today there is a 
new proposal to develop the space as an ice skating rink.181 
Few entities have dominated the City political landscape in recent 
years more than the Working Families Party (WFP).  A progressive, 
labor-backed third party that supports liberal Democrats as a fusion 
ticket more often than it runs against Democrats, the WFP scored a 
number of electoral successes in 2009, claiming credit for John Liu’s 
Comptroller and Public Advocate Bill de Blasio’s victorious 
campaigns.182  Its robust campaign infrastructure similarly has run 
sophisticated mailing and canvassing operations to support 
progressive, pro-union candidates throughout the city, including city 
council races.183 
The WFP’s get-out-the-vote operation has come under scrutiny, 
however.  The WFP’s campaign operation, Data and Field Services, 
was accused of providing below-cost services to candidates supported 
 
 177. A narrower version of the “living wage” legislation was passed into law in 
2012, overriding Mayor Bloomberg’s veto.  Bloomberg sued to block the law in July 
2012, and litigation is still pending. See Barbara Ross, Bloomberg Sues City Council 
to Block ‘Living Wage’ Law, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 27, 2012, 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-07-27/news/32893800_1_minimum-wage-mayor-
bloomberg-city-subsidies. 
 178. Sam Dolnick, Voting 45-1, Council Rejects $310 Million Plan for Mall at 
Bronx Armory, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
12/15/nyregion/15armory.html. 
 179. See Related Companies, MONEY MONACLE, http://vote.sigfig.com/org/ 
Related%20Companies/- (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 180. Dolnick, supra note 176. 
 181. Winnie Hu, Ice Center with 9 Rinks Is Proposed for Bronx Armory, NY 
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/nyregion/ice-center-
proposed-for-kingsbridge-armory.html. 
 182. De Blasio is the likeliest candidate to receive support from the Working 
Families Party in his run for mayor.  His haul from unions is already significant. See 
generally Searchable Database: Bill de Blasio, 2013, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., 
http://www.nyccfb.info/searchabledb/SimpleSearchResult.aspx?election_cycle=2013&
cand_id=326&cand_name=de+Blasio%2c+Bill (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 183. See Courtney Gross, Proposal Could Shed Light on Who Helps Candidates, 
GOTHAM GAZETTE (June 1, 2010), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/ 
archives/532-proposal-could-shed-light-on-who-helps-candidates. 
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by the WFP during the 2009 elections, precisely the type of illegal 
coordination the CFB seeks to avoid.184  Shortly after the election, a 
plaintiff’s firm led by former Giuliani deputy mayor Randy Mastro 
filed a lawsuit claiming illegal campaign coordination.185  The WFP 
initially settled, admitting no wrongdoing, and agreed to make Data 
and Field Services a truly independent entity from the WFP.186  The 
settlement was not fulfilled, however, and the WFP was found in 
contempt.187  Today the WFP is also under investigation for illegal 
campaign coordination by the Staten Island District Attorney’s 
office.188  Despite these legal challenges, the WFP intends to maintain 
its impressive canvassing operation in 2013 by having candidates pay 
for those services directly.189 
E. The Real Estate Industry: Builders and Bundlers 
The real estate industry makes no secret about its role in New 
York politics.  In 2009, the Real Estate Board of New York 
(REBNY) poured more than $500,000 into a handful of city council 
races—four Democratic primaries and one general election—in an 
effort to support candidates whose policies were more favorable to 
landlords than their WFP-supported opponents.190  REBNY used the 
Independence Party as their vessel to send mailers and fund 
canvassers.191  In addition to their outsider role in the 2009 city council 
races, REBNY directly contributed more than $3.5 million to New 
York State Senate races in 2010.192  A single real estate developer 
 
 184. Roy Edroso, Anti-WFP Suit Charges Debi Rose Didn’t Pay Enough for 
Services (or at Least Not Fast Enough), VILLAGE VOICE BLOG (Oct. 27, 2009, 11:08 
AM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2009/10/anti-wfp_suit_c.php. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Azi Paybarah, Working Families Concedes and Downsizes Without 
Admitting Wrongdoing or Defeat, CAPITAL N.Y. (Oct. 26, 2011 6:00 AM), 
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2011/10/3897901/working-families-
party-concedes-and-downsizes-without-admitting-wro. 
 187. Liz Benjamin, The Death of DFS, CAPITAL TONIGHT (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://capitaltonightny.ynn.com/2011/10/the-death-of-dfs/. 
 188. Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, New Investigation for Working Families Party, 
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/ 
20120426/POLITICS/120429920. 
 189. Benjamin, supra note 187. 
 190. Eliot Brown, Landlords Have a Party, N.Y. OBSERVER, Dec. 9, 2009, 
http://observer.com/2009/12/landlords-have-a-party/. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Eliot Brown, Real Estate Flexes Muscle, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704127904575544323181587664.html. 
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used campaign finance law loopholes to funnel more than $900,000 
into 2012 State Senate races.193  During the 2013 election cycle the real 
estate community may potentially flex its muscle even more than 
usual through unchecked independent expenditures.  Given its track 
record and the stakes in this election cycle, it probably will. 
The real estate industry thus far has coalesced around Democratic 
frontrunner, Christine Quinn.194  Quinn has accepted maximum 
contributions ($4,950) from dozens of individuals in the real estate 
industry, including significant contributions from Related Companies, 
Liberty Title, Cushman & Wakefield, Vornado Realty, CB Richard 
Ellis, Rudin Management, Dermot Company, and Benjamin 
Companies.195  Jay Kriegel from Related Companies, Mario Palumbo 
from Millenium Partners, REBNY Chair Mary Ann Tighe, and 
William Zeckendorf, the owner of Zeckdorf Realty, are among 
Quinn’s top intermediaries, each raising at least $34,000 for her 
campaign.196  One must note that the other candidates for mayor, Bill 
de Blasio,197 John Liu,198 and Bill Thompson,199 have all received 
considerable contributions from major developers. 
 
 193. Beth Morrissey, Real Estate Big Blankets State Senate Races with 
Contributions, N.Y. WORLD (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/ 
2012/09/12/litwin-senate-spending/. 
 194. Quinn has also earned significant backing from the legal community.  A 
number of law firms have provided Quinn with at least $20,000, including Paul, 
Weiss; Skadden Arps; Weil, Gotshal; Sullivan & Cromwell; Paul Hastings; and 
notably, Gibbons, a mid-sized firm with offices in New York and New Jersey that has 
contributed over $50,000 to her campaign. See generally Searchable Database: 
Christine Quinn, 2013, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/ 
searchabledb/SimpleSearchResult.aspx?cand_id=204&cand_name=Quinn,%20Christ
ine%20C&election_cycle=2013 (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).  Law firms are well known 
for their financial support of political candidates.  In 2008, the legal industry 
contributed $234 million to campaigns, overwhelmingly to Democratic candidates. 
See Lawyers/Law Firms: Top Contributors 2011–12, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=K01 (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).  
The industry reprised its role in the 2010 federal elections. See Amanda Becker, Law 
and Lobbying Firms Pump Millions of Dollars into Midterm Campaigns, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 1, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/10/29/AR2010102905908.html. 
 195. See generally Searchable Database: Christine Quinn, 2013, supra note 194. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See generally Searchable Database: Bill De Blasio, 2013, supra note 182. 
 198. See generally Searchable Database: John C. Liu, 2013, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. 
BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/searchabledb/SimpleSearchResult.aspx?election_cycle= 
2013&cand_id=FI&cand_name=Liu%2c+John+C (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 199. See generally Searchable Database: William C. Thompson Jr., 2013, N.Y.C. 
CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., http://www.nyccfb.info/searchabledb/SimpleSearchResult.aspx? 
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Sometimes unions and real estate developers share common goals.  
Large development projects might pique the interest of both the real 
estate development community and unions.  For example, during the 
fall of 2012 the planning process for the expansion of the Chelsea 
Market was underway.200  Supporters included the REBNY, the 
Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York, and 
the SEIU Local 32BJ.201  The prospect of temporary construction 
jobs, permanent office jobs, and lasting real estate revenues leads to 
such politically powerful coalitions.  The only organized opposition to 
such projects comes in the form of neighborhood groups, which are 
often powerless to stop such developments.  All candidates running 
for office need to be secure in their ability to fundraise and turn out 
the vote to take the political risk of alienating the enormous spigots of 
campaign cash and volunteers that the real estate lobby and union 
tandems offer. 
F. Citizens United, Ray Kelly, and Joe Lhota 
If there is any individual in New York City politics who can benefit 
from a post-Citizens United landscape, it is Police Commissioner Ray 
Kelly.  The recipient of consistently strong approval ratings,202 despite 
recent controversy over the NYPD’s “stop and frisk” procedures,203 
Kelly’s candidacy has been floated for several years, generally by 
Mayor Bloomberg supporters who do not see an obvious heir to 
Bloomberg’s legacy.  A poll taken last year showed Kelly with 
significant support compared to the current candidates.204 
 
election_cycle=2013&cand_id=260&cand_name=Thompson%2c+Jr.%2c+William+C 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
 200. Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Stringer Out on Limb Against Chelsea Market 
Plan, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (July 20, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/ 
article/20120719/REAL_ESTATE/120719859. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See, e.g., Poll Gives Ray Kelly Record Approval Rating, CBS N.Y. (Jan. 17, 
2013, 11:18 AM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/01/17/poll-gives-ray-kelly-record-
approval-rating/. 
 203. See, e.g., NYPD Stop and Frisk: Ray Kelly Lashes Out at Critics in Daily 
News Editorial, HUFF POST N.Y. (May 21, 2012, 11:14 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/21/nypd-stop-and-frisk-ray-kelly-daily-
news_n_1532930.html (describing Ray Kelly’s response to criticism over the NYPD’s 
stop and frisk practices). 
 204. See Bloomberg Losing Focus As Approval Sags, New Yorkers Tell 
Quinnipiac University Poll; Kelly, Quinn Lead 2013 Mayoral Pack, QUINNIPIAC U. 
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-centers/polling-institute/new-
york-city/release-detail/?ReleaseID=1663. 
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For his part, Kelly has never given an affirmative indication that he 
is interested in running—in fact, he has insisted that he does not plan 
to run.205  Given that he lacks the independent wealth of someone like 
Bloomberg or Castimatidis, this hesitancy would ordinarily be fatal to 
mounting a race for mayor of New York City; as of the time of this 
publication, Kelly would have mere months to raise the millions of 
dollars necessary to run a competitive race, introduce himself to 
voters, and broadcast his positions on issues other than policing.  
Citizens United and its progeny are what could still make Kelly’s 
candidacy possible, however.  A few wealthy backers could jumpstart 
his campaign overnight and sustain his messaging, albeit in an 
uncoordinated manner. 
Kelly’s story raises an interesting perspective in the debate over 
independent expenditures.  If one puts aside the contentious debate 
over his performance as police commissioner and assumes that he is 
the ideal public servant, then the opportunities for outside parties to 
do the heavy financial lifting for Kelly’s candidacy may be a boon to 
democracy.  Would voters prefer a sitting police commissioner to 
fundraise extensively while on the job?  If not, should members of a 
mayor’s administration have to choose between performing their 
duties and running for office, when legislators and other elected 
officials clearly do not so limit themselves?  And finally, does 
spending large sums of money on behalf of an individual known, for 
better or worse, by his record as police commissioner, carry the same 
self-interested taint as spending on a candidate for his or her track 
record on real estate deals or tax subsidies?206  If the success of the 
small donor matching system is to make democracy more 
participatory for voters and candidates without wealth, this not-so-
hypothetical example demonstrates the argument that John 
McComish made, namely that loosened campaign finance laws can 
sometimes make democracy more accessible, not less. 
There are fewer hypotheticals when considering the candidacy of 
Joe Lhota.  Lhota served as Mayor Giuliani’s Deputy Mayor for 
Operations, and later as Chairman of the Metropolitan Transit 
 
 205. Joe Coscarelli, Ray Kelly Adamant He’s Not Running for Mayor or Violating 
Anyone’s Civil Liberties, DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 11, 2013, 9:34 AM), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/01/ray-kelly-adamant-hes-not-running-for-
mayor.html. 
 206. The most obvious counterargument is that a candidate with unformed 
positions on issues would be more beholden, not less, to the benefactors that 
supported him, and benefactors with significant resources, as discussed throughout 
Part III, usually have specific agendas. 
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Authority (MTA).207  His performance in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Sandy garnered a wave of positive press, and in January 2013 he 
resigned his MTA position to declare his candidacy for mayor, doing 
so at the annual meeting of the New York Building Congress.208  
While his initial poll numbers are strong,209 and his wife has been 
called a “fundraising powerhouse,”210 Lhota’s late entry into the race 
and the disparity between Democratic and Republican party 
registration in New York City suggest that his viability will depend in 
part on whether an outside entity spends liberally on his behalf. 
IV.  REGULATIONS, PENALTIES, AND LOOPHOLES 
Having established the origin of the New York City system in Part 
I, the jurisprudential confines of election law in Part II, and the 
players who can be expected to thrive under the new campaign 
finance regime in Part III, we turn to a critically important question 
for those looking to New York City as a model: Do regulators have 
the teeth to make the system work?  Any law is only as effective as 
the threat of robust enforcement.  In the zero-sum world of elections, 
establishing effective deterrence is challenging because the benefit of 
winning office almost always outweighs the cost of punitive measures 
taken after illegal campaign activity. 
A. The CFB Metes Out Meek Punishments 
Without an effective mechanism for punishing non-compliance, the 
Campaign Finance Act’s meticulously crafted provisions will do little 
to deter illicit campaign activity.  The CFB has not been shy about 
handing out fines for campaign violations, and unlike its state 
counterpart, which strikes little fear into the hearts of lax 
 
 207. Celeste Katz, As Joe Lhota Deliberates About a 2013 Mayoral Run, His Wife 
Is His Sounding Board, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 7, 2012, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2012/12/as-joe-lhota-deliberates-
about-a-2013-mayoral-run-his-wife-is-his-sounding-boa. 
 208. David Seifman, Lhota: ‘I Would Not Have Left the MTA . . . If I Wasn’t 
Going to Run for Mayor, N.Y. POST, Jan. 15, 2013, http://www.nypost.com/p/ 
news/local/would_mayor_have_left_the_mta_run_1cfcPs4M5O0eJjwZKq88MO. 
 209. Celeste Katz, Former MTA Chairman Joseph Lhota Leads Possible GOP 
Mayoral Candidates but Would Get Crushed by Democrats: Poll, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, 
Jan. 17, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/dem-rivals-trounce-lhota-poll-
article-1.1241656. 
 210. Katz, supra note 207. 
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campaigns,211 its reports demonstrate an impressive attention to the 
details of every campaign filing.  The weakness in the CFB’s 
regulation, however, is that the fines are simply insubstantial to 
castigate improper behavior. 
Consider the 2009 election cycle.  Councilmember Mathieu Eugene 
was found to have violated a number of campaign finance laws on ten 
occasions, particularly the provision that campaign contributions must 
be spent in furtherance of the campaign.212  Because the CFB found 
that these ten violations represented $6,087.77 in undocumented 
funds, Eugene was fined $608 ($4,666 for all of his violations).213  This 
means that if Eugene or any other candidate sought to appropriate 
campaign funds for personal use, which might be particularly 
tempting in a non-competitive election cycle, the worst they can 
expect from the CFB is a 10% “getting caught tax.”  Despite these 
troubles, Councilmember Eugene received $109,742 in public 
matching funds.214 
The last decade has also seen several instances of improper 
coordination between candidates and outside groups.  When SEIU 
organizer Annabel Palma ran for City Council in 2003, the SEIU 
spent heavily on the campaign.215  An investigation by the CFB found 
that the SEIU had illegally collaborated with the candidate, to put it 
mildly.216  The SEIU had essentially run Palma’s campaign out of their 
offices, from printing literature to running its “get out the vote” 
operation.217  As a result, the SEIU was assessed with three penalties 
of $10,000 each.218  This figure hardly acts as a deterrent against one of 
the most powerful unions in the country meddling in future races.  
The $30,000 penalty sends a message to unions, corporations, and 
 
 211. Jon Campbell, $31 Million in New York Campaign Accounts Unreported, 
Group Claims, EFFECTIVENY.ORG (Aug. 22, 2012), http://effectiveny.org/press-
clip/news-coverage/small-donor-empowerment/democrat-and-chronicle-31-million-
new-york-campaign. 
 212. Mathieu Eugene, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. (2009), 
http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/PM/CY2012PM_Eugene_071212.pdf; see also Celeste 
Katz, Campaign Finance Board Sets $17.5k in Fines, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 12, 2012, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2012/07/campaign-finance-board-
sets-175k-in-fines. 
 213. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 214. Id. 
 215. ANNABEL PALMA FINAL AUDIT, supra note 68, at 6. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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other outside influence peddlers that the cost of electing a favorable 
city councilmember is a modest cost of doing business. 
Even worse, during Palma’s own legal investigation, the newly 
elected councilmember used union funds to pay for her legal fees and 
the penalties that the CFB assessed against her.219  Kevin Finnegan, 
1199 SEIU’s political director, established a legal defense fund worth 
at least $64,000, with $51,675 that the SEIU contributed and the rest 
contributed from other unions and political sources.220  In her defense, 
Palma claimed, “That fund was created separate and apart from my 
knowledge.  It’s an independent fund.”221  On a separate occasion, 
Palma remarked, “I had no idea how I was going to pay this.  The 
CFB was calling me on a daily basis just like a creditor would.  Was 
the fund a blessing?  I think so.  If not, I would have been over 
$100,000 in the hole to this day.”222  The CFB did not even make its 
determination until 2007, by which point Palma had been reelected.223  
She went on to win reelection to a final term in 2009.224 
Palma is not the only recent candidate to use the independent 
funds of potentially interested parties in paying off campaign finance 
violations.  Unions have also contributed to the legal defense funds of 
Councilmembers Elizabeth Crowley and Jose Rivera.225  Rivera 
needed to pay for his legal defense after the CFB fined him $56,245 
for violations accrued during his 2003 campaign. The defense fund’s 
address was identical to the address listed in Rivera’s City Council 
campaign finance account.226  In response to the Gotham Gazette’s 
reporting on this trend, Citizens Union executive director Dick 
Dadey remarked, “I’m stunned that this practice is permissible.  It 
undercuts the integrity of the campaign finance penalty system for 
gross violations and misuse of public funds.”227  The practice is legal, 
 
 219. Courtney Gross, Unions Pick Up Tab for Council Members’ Fines, Legal 
Bills, GOTHAM GAZETTE (June 4, 2010), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/ 
archives/535-unions-pick-up-tab-for-council-members-fines-legal-bills. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Michael Clancy, Campaign Finance Board Fines Barron, Palma, and Four 
Others, VILLAGE VOICE BLOG (Oct. 11, 2007, 3:02 PM), 
http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2007/10/campaign_financ.php. 
 224. 2009 Election Results, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, http://elections.nytimes.com/ 
2009/results/city-council.html. 
 225. Gross, supra note 219.  Rivera has been the city council majority leader since 
2006. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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however, because contributions to legal defense funds do not 
technically advocate for the victory or defeat of individual candidates.  
This allows them to operate outside of the CFB’s regulated 
contribution structure, and outside parties can even contribute 
unlimited amounts to defense funds of candidates who participate in 
the CFB’s public matching funds program. 
Many of the other candidates discovered to have violated the 
Campaign Finance Act were also incumbents, making their mistakes 
less attributable to lack of familiarity with the rules.  Councilmember 
Vincent Ignizio was fined $1,802 for a variety of violations, including 
going over the spending limit, even as he received $88,450 in public 
funds.  Councilmember Vincent Gentile was fined $26,882 for similar 
offenses.228  Councilmember Ydanis Rodriguez was fined $4,750.229  In 
defense of the candidates, some of the violations related to filing 
omissions and did not imply foul play.  The small fine amounts are of 
little consequence to these officials, however, who, having won 
reelection, are in a position to raise more funds from their donors.  
Indeed, if a candidate competing in a close election had to choose 
between risking a fine of several thousand dollars or risking his 
career, the politically and fiscally prudent choice would be clear to 
most candidates.  The candidate simply needs to remember to pay the 
fine before the next election cycle so that he is eligible for another 
round of matching funds.230 
These stories of elected officials flouting even basic campaign 
regulations demonstrate how difficult it is to hold campaign finance 
lawbreakers accountable.  Even if these officials’ fines had been more 
severe, their adept legal teams and well-funded supporters likely 
could have mitigated them or paid them.231  The CFB is authorized, 
under CFB Rule 2-02, to require a campaign to forfeit all public 
matching funds if it has been found to improperly coordinate with an 
 
 228. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., FINAL AUDITS: VINCENT GENTILE (2009), 
available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/PM/EC2009PM_Gentile_120811.pdf. 
 229. N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., FINAL AUDITS: YDANIS RODRIGUEZ (2009), 
available at http://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/PM/EC2009PM_Rodriguez_120811.pdf. 
 230. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-703(1)(n) (2012). 
 231. One notable recent exception is former City Councilmember Kendall Stewart, 
who was required to pay $200,000 in fines—all of the public funds he received and 
more than $60,000 in penalties—for committing numerous infractions.  This 
staggering fine led election lawyer Jerry Goldfeder to remark, “The candidate had to 
have really ran afoul of the campaign finance laws for such a Draconian penalty.  It’s 
very rare.” Nathaniel Herz, Ex-Councilmember Hit with $200k Bill from Campaign 
Finance Board, N.Y. WORLD (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/ 
2012/11/15/ex-councilmember-hit-with-200k-bill-from-campaign-finance-board/. 
MARTON_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/2013  7:22 PM 
714 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
allegedly independent actor.232  This measure does not appear to have 
been used very frequently.  Likewise, the CFB may fine up to $10,000 
per violation, and revoke all public funds for a “fundamental breach” 
of CFB regulations, but the CFB does not hand down either of these 
punishments often enough to create a realistic deterrence.233  Criminal 
activity, of course, can be referred to law enforcement.234 
Perhaps the law should be amended to make an entity convicted of 
illegal coordination ineligible to participate in the following election 
cycle.  While such a law would certainly be challenged on First 
Amendment grounds, restricting the speech of an entity convicted of 
corruption would surely warrant consideration for the type of speech 
that can be regulated to reduce the appearance of corruption.  For 
now, the CFB is obviously prohibited from declaring an election 
winner invalid or meting out some other severe punishment, as an 
arbiter of some other contest might upon finding conclusive evidence 
that the winner cheated, and it must rely on the weak enforcement 
stick of small fines.  Smartly, however, the CFB knows that shaming 
comes with its own deterrent effect.  All of the examples provided 
above were discussed in daily newspaper publications, bringing 
disrepute to the elected official highlighted.  The CFB makes access 
to this information easy for the media, good government groups, and 
political opponents by posting its determinations publicly as soon as it 
makes them (which, unfortunately, may be quite some time after the 
election), and emailing these determinations to anyone who signs up 
for the CFB’s notifications. 
B. More Matching Fund Misuse 
Critics have accused campaigns of using public matching funds to 
boost campaign treasuries, even in the absence of competitive 
reelection races.235  Because so many races for local office are non-
competitive, many candidates—usually incumbents—do not even use 
the funds they are given for campaign purposes.236  Out of 140 
 
 232. See GOLDFEDER, supra note 12, at 22 n.72. 
 233. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-711(2)(b) (2012); N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD. R. 2-02 
(2010), available at http://www.nyccfb.info/act-program/rules/index.aspx#2_02. 
 234. See GOLDFEDER, supra note 12, at 43. 
 235. Ray Rivera, Russ Buettner & William Rashbaum, In Council Campaigns, 
Relatives on the Payroll, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/04/25/nyregion/25council.html. 
 236. In theory, the CFB would not provide matching funds in noncompetitive 
races, but candidates can submit a “Statement of Need” and can ask for funds using 
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candidates accepting public funds during the 2009 election cycle, only 
one refunded the balance of his matching funds in its entirety, and 
only eleven refunded any money at all.237  The leftover money was 
used to pay for victory parties, parking tickets, fines for poster 
violations, and even fundraisers to raise more money eligible for 
future matching funds.238  Even more scandalously, public matching 
funds have been funneled to family members of candidates without 
evidence that they worked on a campaign.239  Steering campaign funds 
in such a manner is questionably legal even when private campaign 
funds are involved, but even greater care should be taken when 
taxpayer funds are concerned.  Jurisdictions emulating New York 
City’s model should consider the backlash against taxpayer money 
inappropriately funding campaigns and plan spending guidelines 
accordingly, especially for noncompetitive races. 
C. The Department of Sanitation and New York City 
Campaigns 
Interestingly, there is another entity that hits candidates hard both 
through media shaming and the wallet.  The Department of 
Sanitation has the unenviable task of removing the thousands of 
illegal campaign posters hanging from property around the city the 
morning after an election.  The price of using city property for last 
minute voter outreach is not cheap; the Department of Sanitation 
fines candidates $75 for each violation.240  Nearly every mayor runs 
afoul of this regulation to some degree; in 2009 Mayor Bloomberg 
paid over $5,000 in fines for violations.241  But while Bloomberg is 
seemingly always in position to cut such a check, other campaigns 
often find their campaign coffers near empty at the very time they are 
asked to pay these violations. 
 
even the specter of an opponent as justification. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-705(7) 
(2012). 
 237. Chris Glorioso, Candidates Who Take Public Funds Rarely Pay Back 
Taxpayers, NBC N.Y. (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/ 
Candidates-Who-Take-Public-Funds-Rarely-Pay-Taxpayers-Back-119099959.html. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Rivera et al., supra note 235. 
 240. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF SANITATION, A SUMMARY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS 
8 (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dsny/downloads/pdf/rules/digest/ 
DSNY_Rules_Reg.pdf. 
 241. Michael Howard Saul, Bloomberg, Liu Trade Barbs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 
2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443404004577581683739863 
926.html. 
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The Department of Sanitation fined Bill Thompson $594,375 for 
violations committed during his 2009 mayoral race,242 Bill de Blasio 
more than $300,000 for his violations committed during his Public 
Advocate race,243 and John Liu $527,400 for violations committed 
during his Comptroller race.244  The New York Post suggested that it 
was long overdue for de Blasio to pay the fine to remove it “as a 
potential issue from his campaign,”245 a statement just as applicable to 
de Blasio’s 2013 mayoral opponents, Liu and Thompson.  Each of the 
candidates could legally use their public matching funds to pay off the 
fines, though that would be hundreds of thousands of dollars less that 
they could spend on more pressing needs in their mayoral races. 
D. The “Doing Business” Loophole 
Part II of this Article analyzed the City’s “pay to play” provision 
(also called the “doing business” provision), including the litigation 
over its constitutionality in Ognibene v. Parkes.  According to a 
recent investigative report by the New York World, however, the 
regulation may have a considerable loophole.246  When New York 
World crosschecked the list of intermediaries registered with the CFB 
against the New York City’s Doing Business database, it found 
“[d]ozens of executives of companies that do business with city 
government . . . raising nearly $1 million so far on behalf of 
prospective 2013 candidates for mayor.”247  Serving as an intermediary 
is not technically in violation of the provision limiting those doing 
business with the city to $400 contributions.248  But allowing those 
individuals to deliver enormous funds to campaigns certainly flouts 
 
 242. Editorial, Bill Thompson Must Stop Trying to Weasel Out of Paying Fines, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 12, 2012, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-04-
12/news/31326903_1_illegal-campaign-posters-public-campaign-financing-jerry-
goldfeder. 
 243. David Seifman, Poster Boy de Blasio to Pay 300G, N.Y. POST, Sept. 29, 2011, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/poster_boy_de_blasio_to_pay_qru5bAz9jn4MKz
GhDeXAyH. 
 244. Saul, supra note 241. 
 245. Seifman, supra note 243. 
 246. Beth Morrissey, The Campaign Finance Loophole Developers Love, N.Y. 
WORLD (Aug. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Morrissey, Loophole], 
http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2012/08/07/the-campaign-finance-loophole-
developers-love/; see also Beth Morrissey, Unpacking Campaign Bundlers, N.Y. 
WORLD (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2012/08/09/unpacking-
campaign-bundlers/. 
 247. Morrissey, Loophole, supra note 246. 
 248. Intermediaries are governed under N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-702(12). 
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the intention of the law.  The New York World investigation noted 
the particular prevalence of real estate developers among the 
intermediaries, giving the example of Jay Kriegel, a lobbyist from 
Related Companies who has bundled nearly $100,000 for Quinn, de 
Blasio, and Thompson.249  New York World notes that Related 
Companies recently won the right to build at Willets Point in Queens, 
an area that may become a major commercial development zone.250  
In 2009, Related Companies earned Council approval for Related’s 
development of Hudson Yards, and, thanks to Quinn, were exempted 
from the Council’s living wage bill for that project.251  The 
intermediary who has bundled the most money so far for an 
individual 2013 candidate is Charles Dorego, a senior vice president 
at the real estate company Glenwood Management, who channeled 
almost $150,000 to Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer, who 
ran for mayor throughout 2012 before switching to the comptroller 
race.252 
This loophole is not the only problem with the “pay to play” 
provisions.  Some have criticized them for not extending to municipal 
unions, despite their obvious history of political spending and the risk 
of corruption between the unions seeking new contracts and elected 
officials determining them.  Under the provision, “A union that 
negotiates a collective bargaining agreement with the [C]ity on behalf 
of its members” is not considered to be “doing business” with the 
City, unless the union is a registered lobbyist or involved in a real 
property transaction with the City.253  Additionally, under the “doing 
business” law, corporations, partnerships and LLCs can donate to 
PACs, but PACs “cannot make contributions with money received 
from prohibited sources.”254  One wonders how effectively the CFB 
can track a PAC’s movement of such highly fungible campaign funds. 
 
 249. Morrissey, Loophole, supra note 246. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Dana Rubinstein, The Hudson Yards Exception and Christine Quinn’s 
Business-Safe Liberalism, CAPITAL N.Y. (Mar. 30, 2012, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/03/5588041/hudson-yards-
exception-and-christine-quinns-business-safe-liberalis. 
 252. Shane Dixon Kavanaugh, Mayoral Backers Raising Bundles, CRAIN’S N.Y. 
BUS. (Jan. 22, 2012), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120122/ 
POLITICS/301229972. 
 253. Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., 
http://www.nyccfb.info/candidates/candidates/doing_biz_faq.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 
2013) (follow “Are unions included in the DBDB?” hyperlink). 
 254. Id. (follow “If a business is in the DBDB, can the business form a political 
action committee that can make contributions to city candidates?” hyperlink). 
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E. Regulating Political “Charities” 
As discussed in Part I, New York City began requiring independent 
organizations to disclose their campaign expenditures in late 2012.  At 
the federal level, political outfits masquerading as 501(c)(4) non-
profits, such as Americans for Prosperity (backed by the billionaire 
brothers Charles and David Koch) and the Karl Rove-led Crossroads 
GPS have been held to no such disclosure obligations,255 allowing 
wealthy donors and corporate interests to donate funds without the 
scrutiny that disclosure brings.  Under the law, 501(c)(4)s are 
required to serve a predominantly charitable, educational, or 
recreational purpose in order to reap the benefits of being a tax-
exempt social welfare group.256  In 2012, the IRS sent detailed 
inquiries to investigate whether such organizations were flouting the 
law by raising and spending funds exclusively for political purposes, 
which would carry significant fines for the organizations; 
unfortunately, no such investigations were concluded by the end of 
the 2012 general elections.257  Likewise, an attempted lawsuit to have 
the names of certain non-profit donors released was recently turned 
back by the D.C. Circuit.258  These efforts to put such nonprofit 
organizations under greater scrutiny, however, may impact their 
political aggressiveness in New York City’s upcoming elections. 
Meanwhile, New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman 
has launched an investigation into New York-based nonprofits across 
the political spectrum seeking the same information.259  The Attorney 
General’s office has jurisdiction over 501(c)(4)s that raise $25,000 or 
more from New Yorkers,260 and given the prevalence of New York 
City fundraising for both Democratic and Republican-affiliated 
groups, that included most of the prominent 501(c)(4)s that were 
 
 255. See Peter Overby, As Election Nears, Keeping Donors a Secret Is Trickier, 
NPR (Sept. 8, 2012, 5:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/08/160788546/as-election-
nears-keeping-donors-a-secret-is-trickier. 
 256. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2006). 
 257. Brody Mullins & Jacob Gershman, IRS Probes Non-Profit Political Groups, 
WALL. ST. J., June 27, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702 
304830704577493054251481454.html. 
 258. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Christopher Van Hollen, 694 F.3d 108 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012).  The court held that the F.E.C. should clarify these rules, though paralysis 
at the regulatory body suggests that an immediate clarification is unlikely. 
 259. Nicholas Confessore, Groups’ Campaign Spending Scrutinized in New York, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/us/politics/eric-
schneiderman-investigating-groups-campaign-spending.html. 
 260. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-a (McKinney 2002). 
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involved in the 2012 election.  Thus far there is no New York City 
equivalent of Americans for Prosperity, but if one were to emerge, it 
is reasonable to assume that Attorney General Schneiderman would 
join the CFB in monitoring it closely.  Daniel Kurtz, former head of 
the Attorney General’s Charities Bureau, commented, “If he can 
make an example of somebody, I think that can really have some 
consequences.”261  In January 2013, Schneiderman began hearings on 
a requirement that all non-profits that spend over $100,000 on city 
and state elections, including 501(c)(4)s, register with the state to 
disclose contributions of over $100.262  The far-reaching proposal 
earned the praise of Democratic mayoral candidates Quinn, de 
Blasio, and Thompson, but Schneiderman acknowledged that the 
plan had opponents, and “he expected to defend these changes in 
court.”263 
F. The “Member-to-Member” Exception 
Early in 2013, the City Council approved Intro 978, legislation that 
exempts organizations, corporations, and unions from disclosing 
communications related to candidates in an election year.264  The bill 
originated out of concern that the CFB’s 2010 regulations concerning 
coordination between candidates and outside groups had become so 
onerous that organizations could not even request biographical 
information from candidates, or even schedule with them.265  In 
response, the CFB had issued an advisory opinion clarifying that such 
“logistical” activities were permitted.266  Nevertheless, the legislation 
moved forward and passed overwhelmingly.  Mayor Bloomberg 
criticized the legislation as a “terrible idea” that would allow 
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(Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2013/01/15/campaign-rules/. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Nick Powell, NYC Council Amends Campaign Finance Disclosure Rules, 
CITY & STATE (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.cityandstateny.com/city-council-passes-bill-
amending-campaign-finance-disclosure-rules/. 
 265. Beth Morrissey, Campaign Finance Board Fires Back at City Council, N.Y. 
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corporations and unions to “get around [campaign finance limits].”267  
The CFB also strongly opposed the legislation, with Executive 
Director Amy Loprest stating in testimony before the City Council 
that “[d]isclosure of money in politics is fundamental to the 
democratic process,” and “a campaign message is a campaign 
message, no matter where or to which audience it is aimed.”268  For 
unions with large memberships, this legislation will act as an end run 
around campaign finance laws, though the City Council vote suggests 
a widespread political consensus that member-to-member 
communications should be treated differently than external advocacy.  
Meanwhile, it remains to be seen whether corporations will exercise 
the right to communicate with their shareholders, and which other 
membership organizations will take advantage of the legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
Public support for limiting the influence of money in elections is 
overwhelming.269  Given the enormous challenge of preventing special 
interest money from flowing where it seeks to go, the CFB should be 
commended for its relentless and meticulous enforcement of the law.  
Many of its shortcomings are statutory, jurisprudential or resource-
related, but its savvy use of the charter amendment process, 
presentation of data, and media accessibility make it a potent, 
nonpartisan force for reform.  No large jurisdiction adopting New 
York City’s campaign finance model would be able to effectively 
implement it without an organization approaching the CFB’s caliber. 
Yet for all of the CFB’s successes in reducing the flow of special 
interest money, problems endemic to a private contribution-driven 
finance system remain.  Special interest groups with specific 
legislative and contracting goals, like real estate groups, unions, law 
firms, teachers, and charter school proponents, may not be permitted 
to make contributions of greater than $4,950 per person, but they still 
vastly outspend the average citizen.  Such groups had a 
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disproportionate influence on local elections before Citizens United 
and other decisions gave them carte blanche to throw their weight 
around as independent entities. 
Even a system that publicly matches funds may not generate a 
nexus between certain pressing local issues and the donors who fund 
campaigns.  Consider what will likely be one of the main policy issues 
being discussed during the lead-up to the 2013 mayoral campaign, the 
New York Police Department’s use of “stop and frisk” as a street-
policing strategy.  The strategy has engendered major opposition, 
particularly in poor communities of color,270 who do not have 
organized election lobbying outfits to make donations, and are 
unlikely to welcome many citywide candidates into their homes for 
cocktail receptions.  Even if public matching funds increase small 
donor diversity, issues like homelessness, AIDS funding, and endemic 
poverty in fringe neighborhoods of the City will remain subordinate 
to the interests of more reliable fundraising sources, or at least 
require the advocacy of affluent donors. 
Another critique that Leo Glickman, a former CFB attorney who 
now advises candidates on election law, has raised is that “one reform 
[the New York City system] has not achieved . . . is addressing the 
advantages of incumbency, especially at the City Council level.”271  A 
year after Glickman’s comments, four Councilmembers lost their 
reelection bids, an astonishing level in a city where, as the New York 
Times put it, “council members were more likely to lose their seats by 
being convicted of a felony than losing an election.”272  The CFB’s 
highly regulated system can seem impenetrable to outsiders, and 
aspects of the system certainly favor incumbents who can utilize 
relationships with political clubs, election lawyers, and the special 
interest groups with whom they interact as office holders. 
For any supporter of campaign finance reform, however, critiques 
of the New York City system pale in comparison to the post-
regulatory landscape that Citizens United’s unfettered First 
Amendment rationale foreshadowed.  At a panel on the potential 
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role of super PACs in the 2013 elections, political operatives warned 
that the independent spenders might see the best “return on 
investment” from cheap city council races.273  Kevin Finnegan (who 
coordinated the payment of Councilmember Palma’s legal fees nearly 
a decade ago),274 commented on unions’ interest in cultivating 
candidates early in their careers.275  Even the operatives skeptical of a 
major infusion of outside spending in the mayoral race believed so 
due to the homogeneous or uninspiring composition of the candidate 
field, rather than a philosophical or strategic objection. 
Thus, reformers should eye New York City’s 2013 elections warily, 
as unlimited expenditures may be unleashed on a system that 
encourages candidates to restrain their own spending to qualify for 
public matching funds. Wealthy individuals, corporations or unions 
could swamp a candidate they oppose.  Indeed, they have all 
demonstrated a propensity to do so before, and do not seem likely to 
hesitate to do so again. 
 
 
 273. Reid Pillifant, What Would a Super PAC Want with the 2013 Mayor’s Race 
Anyway?, CAPITAL N.Y. (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/ 
politics/2012/10/6538533/what-would-super-pac-want-2013-mayors-race-anyway. 
 274. See supra notes 221–22 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Pillifant, supra note 273. 
